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"I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You":
Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence
Roger C. Park*
INTRODUCTION
Definitions of hearsay are either assertion-centered or dec-
larant-centered. Under an assertion definition, an out-of-court
statement is hearsay when offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.' Under a declarant definition, an
out-of-court statement is hearsay when it depends for value on
the credibility of the declarant.2
Over much hearsay territory, the difference between the
two definitions has no effect.3 Most utterances that would be
nonhearsay under the assertion definition also would be
nonhearsay under the declarant definition. The two definitions
can produce different results, however, in classifying an "im-
plied assertion."4
An utterance is being used to prove an implied assertion
when it depends for value on the credibility of the declarant,
but is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.5 An example of such an utterance is a letter describing
a voyage, offered in evidence not to prove anything about the
voyage, but to prove that the person to whom the letter was ad-
dressed was a person of ordinary understanding. When offered
for this purpose, the letter is not being offered to prove the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I thank Charles W. Ad-
ams, Richard D. Friedman, Edward J. Imwinkelried, and Roger W. Kirst for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts, while exonerating them from any re-
sponsibility for the contents. I am grateful to Stefan Sarles for his valuable
work as a research assistant, and also to colleagues John J. Cound and Donald
G. Marshall for their illuminating comments about implied assertion issues.
This article is dedicated to my wife, Suzanne Park, with love and gratitude.
1. FED. R. Evm. 801(a)-(c).
2. See infra note 17.
3. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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truth of what it asserts. Its use in evidence, however, does re-
quire reliance on the declarant's credibility.6
Hearsay scholars tend to prefer the declarant definition to
the assertion definition or to conclude that the two defintions
are the same.8 I disagree with both positions, and attempt in
this Article to refute them. First, I believe that to treat the two
definitions as the same in all circumstances requires an ex-
tremely strained reading of the language of the assertion defini-
tion and, in the federal system, a willingness to ignore the
Advisory Committee's Note.9 Second, the declarant definition
is not superior to the assertion definition, or at least not so
clearly superior that a change in the Federal Rules of Evidence
is needed. Change would eliminate a familiar formula that pro-
vides quick and satisfactory guidance for most situations, and
would raise new interpretive problems.10 Moreover, the asser-
tion definition has led to acceptable results under modern
caselaw.11 A rigorous application of the declarant definition
would require that certain reliable utterances that are now ad-
missible as nonhearsay find a new route to admission.12 This
need would entail either creating still more hearsay exceptions,
or torturing the contours of existing exceptions. A perfect
hearsay definition is unattainable.
This Article examines treatment of implied assertions
under modern caselaw. Part I explains the two definitions and
introduces the implied assertion problem. Part II reviews mod-
ern federal caselaw applying the Federal Rules assertion defini-
tion to implied assertions. Part III analyzes whether the
Federal Rules should adopt a declarant definition in light of
modern caselaw. The Article concludes that the existing defini-
tion remains preferable to a declarant definition.
6. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 707-10 (1962); Seidelson,
Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandary for Federal
Courts, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 741, 774-75 (1986): Wellborn, The Definition of Hear-
say in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 49-64 (1982).
8. See, e.g., commentators cited infra note 20; see also Falkner, The
"Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 RocKY MTN. L.
REv. 133, 136-38 (1961).
9. See infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text.
11. See infra PART II.
12. See infra notes 265-66 and accompanhing text.
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IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY
I. A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE IMPLIED
ASSERTION PROBLEM
A. Two DEFINITIONs OF HEARSAY
The primary reason for excluding hearsay is that the trier
of fact has no adequate basis for evaluating the declarant's
credibility, because the declarant was not subject to cross-exam-
ination under oath in the trier's presence.' 3 Sometimes the
trier can use the declarant's statement without relying on the
declarant's credibility. This is true, for example, when the
statement "John hit me" is offered solely to show that the de-
clarant was conscious at the time of making the statement.14
What is important is that the statement was made, not the
credibility of the person making it. The opposing party can test
the credibility of the trial witness reporting the statement, and
need not test the declarant's credibility.
In contrast, when the out-of-court statement "John hit me"
is offered to prove that John hit the declarant, the trier must
rely on the declarant's credibility to reach the desired conclu-
sion. A mistake or lie by the declarant would undermine the
value of the evidence. Because the out-of-court declarant is not
on the witness stand, the opponent has no opportunity to ex-
plore defects in credibility through cross-examination.
One might expect this explanation for excluding hearsay to
foster a definition that treats out-of-court statements as hearsay
whenever they depend for value on the declarant's credibility
- that is, whenever the "hearsay dangers"'15 of defects in
13. See, e.g., 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362,
at 3 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974); Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV.
957, 958-61 (1974). Secondary reasons for exclusion include the danger of
fabrication by the in-court witness, the risk of overreaching by statement-seek-
ing investigators, and the danger that adversaries will be unfairly surprised
when testimony of one witness unexpectedly comes from the mouth of an-
other. See Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 51, 62-65, 79-80, 83-84, 102-04 (1987).
14. Admittedly, cross-examination of the declarant might serve some pur-
pose. For example, it would help clarify whether the in-court witness was ac-
curately describing the declarant's verbal conduct. Cross-examination is
unnecessary, however, for probing the declarant's credibility.
15. The phrase "hearsay dangers" comes from Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948). Dif-
ferent commentators have given the four dangers different names: Morgan
refers to sincerity, misuse of language, perception, and memory. I&i at 182-88;
see also Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J.
667, 685 (1987) (describing dangers as perception, memory, sincerity, and ar-
ticulateness); Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay": A Simplified Approach to Un-
derstanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 895-898 (1982)
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memory, perception, narration, or sincerity could affect the
value of the testimony.16 Many courts and commentators have
defined hearsay on the basis of whether the trier must rely on
the declarant's credibility.17 Although these definitions vary,'8
I will refer to them collectively as the declarant definition be-
cause they focus on the declarant's testimonial capacities.
The Federal Rules definition differs at least superficially
from the declarant definition. I will call it the assertion defini-
tion, because it focuses on whether an assertion was made, and
the purpose for which the assertion is being offered in evidence.
Under this definition, an out-of-court utterance is hearsay if it
is an assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.19
B. IMPLIED ASSERTIONS UNDER THE TWO DEFINITIONS: THE
COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND OF WRIGHT V. TATH4M
The declarant and assertion definitions often yield the
(describing dangers as narration, sincerity, recordation, and recollection, and
perception). Those who wish to include dangers produced by use of nonverbal
conduct substitute the word "ambiguity" for the danger of misuse of language.
See R. ALLEN & R. KuHNs, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 309
(1989) (defining dangers as sincerity, narration/ambiguity, perception, and
memory); Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, supra note 13, at 958 (describing dan-
gers as ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous memory); A
declarant's statement containing an opinion also involves a danger that the de-
clarant has drawn an illogical inference, but omission of this danger from the
list seems to make no difference in result.
16. Of course, many statements that depend on credibility for value must
be received into evidence for the judicial system to function rationally. Defin-
ing such statements as hearsay would not make them inadmissible; the propo-
nent simply would need to find an exception to the hearsay rule to put them
into evidence. See FED. R. EVIn. 801(d), 803, 804. A hearsay definition encom-
passing all statements that depend for value on the declarant's credibility
would not exclude all such statements, but would highlight the primary reason
for excluding hearsay.
17. See, e.g., Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 431-35 (6th Cir. 1983); 2 JONES
ON EVIDENCE § 8:1 (S. Gard 6th ed. 1972); Tribe, supra note 13, at 958.
18. Compare the definition illustrated in R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBtURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 357-59 (2d ed. 1982) (defining utterance as
not hearsay even if it depends for value on sincerity and narration, as long as
memory and perception dangers are not involved) with the definition illus-
trated in Tribe, supra note 13, at 957-61 (stating that an utterance is hearsay if
any of four dangers are involved).
19. See FED. R. EvM. 801(a)-(c). This article deals solely with the Rule
801(a)-(c) definition of hearsay, not with the additional categories of nonhear-
say utterances created by Rule 801(d). When I refer to definitions of hearsay
in this article, I am referring to the definition in Rule 801(c) and its alterna-
tives, not to the motley collection of statements defined as nonhearsay under
Rule 801(d).
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same results.20 For example, the choice of definition has no ef-
fect on classification of a statement offered to show its effect on
the hearer or reader. When the out-of-court statement "Do it
or I'll kill you," is offered to show that the hearer acted under
duress,21 or "Dr. S is incompetent" is offered merely to show
that the reader was warned of incompetency,2 2 the statement is
not hearsay under either definition. When used for the stated
purpose, it is not offered to prove the truth of any assertion it
contains, nor does it depend for value on the declarant's
credibility.
The two definitions can lead to different results, however,
20. Some commentators treat the definitions as functionally identical
across the board; others recognize differences. See R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 18, at 358-59 (illustrating a version of the declarant
definition as a guide to interpreting the definition of Rule 801(c)); Graham,
supra note 15, at 906-22 (arguing that the "truth of the matter asserted" defini-
tion should be construed to treat all utterances involving hearsay dangers as
hearsay; Professor Graham recognizes that the definition might be construed
otherwise and proposes a clarifying amendment); see also McCORMICK's HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (stating
that assertions that are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted do not
rest for value upon credibility). The current edition of McCormick abandons
this position and states that "if the policy underlying the hearsay rule is
stretched to include all situations where the evidentiary value of a statement
depends on the credibility of an out-of-court declarant, in however slight a de-
gree or without regard to offsetting factors, there exists the possibility of con-
flict between the rule's underlying policy and the definition." McCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 246, at 730 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); cf. id- at 740 (indicating that the
letters in Wright v. Tatham would not be hearsay under Rule 801(c) because
they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated; surely the use of
those letters to show the addressee's competency involves more than slight
hearsay dangers). Other commentators see a difference between the two defi-
nitions. See Wellborn, supra note 7, at 76-77, 91-93 (arguing that the Federal
Rules of Evidence abandon the Wright v. Tatham approach to verbal hearsay,
and that the rules should be amended to restore this aspect of Wright v. Ta-
tham by defining as hearsay statements offered as evidence of the declarant's
belief in a matter, to prove the matter believed). Much of the most interesting
and imaginative work on the definition of hearsay has been heuristic, designed
to aid students in recognizing hearsay dangers and in analyzing hearsay
problems. See R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 15, at 311-13; R. LEMPERT &
S. SALTZBURG, supra note 18, at 357-59; Friedman, supra note 15, at 669-79;
Graham, supra note 15, at 891-99; Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, supra note 13,
at 958-61. Although some of these works suggest an identity of declarant and
assertion definitions, the authors' focus was upon other objectives and I do not
mean to imply that they have misunderstood the implied assertion problem.
21. See United States v. Herrera, 600 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 1979); Sub-
ramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, 1 W.L.R. 965, 969-70 (P.C. Malaya), 100 Sol. J.
566 (1956).
22. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 97 Wis. 2d 521, 549-51, 294
N.W.2d 501, 515-16 (Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 99 Wis. 2d 708, 745, 301 N.W.2d 156,
175 (1981).
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when an utterance is offered to prove an implied assertion.23
The term "implied assertion" has become a term of art for
hearsay writers, who tend to give it a meaning somewhat
broader than what it may connote to many readers. To say that
an utterance is offered as an "implied assertion" is not to say
that the declarant intended to insinuate the fact the proponent
is trying to prove. It merely means that the trier is being asked
to infer that fact from the declarant's utterance.24 The utter-
ance containing the implied assertion does not directly assert
the proposition it is offered to prove. The trier must infer the
proposition by using the utterance as indirect evidence of a be-
lief or state of mind of the declarant. Implied assertions are
hearsay under the declarant definition because they depend for
value on the declarant's credibility.25 Whether the federal defi-
nition of hearsay is different from the declarant definition de-
pends on whether implied assertions are hearsay under Rule
801(c). 26
A good starting point for any discussion of implied asser-
tions is the durable case of Wright v. Tatham.27 The case illus-
trates how verbal and nonverbal conduct can contain implied
assertions and how a declarant's implied assertions can pose
hearsay dangers when used as evidence.
Wright v. Tatham involved a contest over the will of John
Marsden, an English gentleman who left his estate to his stew-
art. Marsden's relative, Admiral Tatham, contested the will,
claiming that Marsden was mentally incompetent.2s The stew-
23. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (defining "implied
assertion").
24. Compare WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1135
(1986) (unabridged), offering as one definition of "imply" the following- "to in-
dicate or call for recognition of as existent, present, or related not by express
statement but by logical inference or association or necessary consequence....
[Tihe philosophy of nature which is implied in Chinese art' - Lawrence Bin-
yon."
The phrase "implied assertion" often has been used in a fashion that is
completely independent of the declarant's intent. Then, it is the jurist or trier
who implies an assertion from the declarant's statement, even though the de-
clarant may not have intended to suggest the assertion. For an example of this
usage, see Finman, supra note 7, at 682 n.3; cf. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987) (implying
warranty of merchantability into contract for sale of goods without regard for
seller's intent.
25. See Tribe, supra note 13, at 969-71.
26. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (explaining Rule 801(c)
hearsay definition).
27. 7 Adolph. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837) (first appeal); 5
Cl. & Fin. 670, 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L. 1838) (second appeal).
28. 5 Cl. & Fin. at 670, 47 Rev. Rep, at 136.
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art, in support of Marsden's competency, offered into evidence
several letters that third persons had written to Marsden. Two
were from a cousin living in America. The first letter from the
cousin described the cousin's sea voyage and his arrival in Alex-
andria, Virginia, where the cousin reported that he was con-
cerned to find the town in a most shocking condition, with five
or ten people a day dying of putrid fever.29 The second letter
from the cousin, written three years later, acknowledged re-
ceipt of a letter and map from Marsden, briefly reported on
news about mutual acquaintances, and closed with expressions
of regard and kinship.30
Two other letters were from clergymen. One was an ab-
rupt one-paragraph letter from the local vicar, telling Marsden
to have his lawyer do something about settling a dispute be-
tween Marsden and the parish.3 1 The other was from the de-
parting curate of a local chapel, whom Marsden had appointed.
It contained fulsome thanks for past favors, a grandiloquent
blessing to Marsden for his goodness, and the entreaty that "[I]t
will afford me pleasure to continue my services during the va-
cancy, if agreeable to you."'32
These letters were written in language suggesting the writ-
ers believed Marsden mentally competent, and the stewart of-
fered them to show that Marsden was in fact mentally
competent. The stewart wanted the trier to infer the writers'
belief in Marsden's competence from the letters, and to infer
from the belief that the fact believed was true.33 The probative
value of the letters depended on suppositions about the declar-
ants' credibility. The Privy Council held them to be hearsay.3
Wright v. Tatham is perhaps as well known for its dicta
about nonverbal conduct as for its holding about admissibility
of the verbal statements before it. In the course of holding that
the verbal statements in the letters were hearsay, the opinions
in W7ight v. Tatham gave several examples of nonverbal con-
duct that the judges considered hearsay because it rested for
value on a belief of the actor.35 One is the famous example of
"the conduct of a deceased captain on a question of seaworthi-
ness, who, after examining every part of the vessel, embarked
29. Id. at 673-74, 47 Rev. Rep. at 138-39.
30. Id. at 674-75, 47 Rev. Rep. at 139-40.
31. I& at 676, 47 Rev. Rep. at 141 (1786 letter).
32. Id- at 678, 47 Rev. Rep. at 142 (1799 letter).
33. Id at 676-79, 47 Rev. Rep. at 140-43.
34. Id. at 773-75, 47 Rev. Rep. at 169-71.
35. 7 Adolph. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516 (Ex. Ch. 1837) (Parke, B.).
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in it with his family. '36
Both the nonverbal conduct dicta and the verbal conduct
holding of Wright v. Tatham have been debated extensively in
the hearsay literature.31 I will start with the debate about non-
verbal conduct. In favor of treating nonverbal conduct offered
to show the actor's belief as hearsay, one can argue that the
risks are similar to those present when verbal hearsay is re-
ceived. When using a ship captain's conduct to infer seaworthi-
ness, the trier of fact must rely on the captain's memory and
perception to reach the desired inference. Moreover, absent
cross-examination, the trier might infer the wrong belief from
the conduct. For example, the trier might infer that the cap-
tain boarded the ship believing it safe when in fact the captain
believed the ship to be dangerous but was willing to take a
chance in order to escape.38
On the other hand, an actor's nonverbal conduct frequently
involves reliance by the actor on the belief implied by the con-
duct. Thus, when the captain sails with the ship the captain
risks drowning if it sinks, so the captain's nonverbal manifesta-
tion of belief is more reliable than would be the mere state-
ment that the ship was safe. Reliance may not always be
present, but it usually is.39 The need for a simple, adminis-
36. 1d., 112 Eng. Rep. at 516, quoted in 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 267,
at 103; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 738 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
37. See generally R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 18, at 366-69
(arguing that excluding nonassertive conduct from the definition of hearsay is
"probably wise" because "the four hearsay dangers will generally pose a far
greater threat to the credibility of intended assertions than they will to the
credibility of assertions implied from conduct"); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 250, at 73741 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (arguing for inclusion of implied asser-
tions on grounds that hearsay dangers of conduct are credibility issues for the
jury, not grounds for exclusion; Falknor, supra note 8, at 134-36 (arguing that
implied assertions involve fewer hearsay dangers because "[a] man does not lie
to himself" with his conduct); Finman, supra note 7, at 686-91; McCormick,
The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 504 (1930) (arguing that exclu-
sion of implied assertions results in banning evidence with "the strongest cir-
cumstantial guarantees of reliability"); Seidelson, supra note 7, at 754-58
(rejecting Advisory Committee's distinction betweein implied and intended as-
sertions and noting that in Wright v. Tatham "the sincerity of each author
should be pretty much the same whether or not each had intended to assert a
belief in Marsden's competence"; Wellborn, supra note 7, at 76-77, 91-93 (argu-
ing that Rule 801 should be amended to incorporate the holding of Wright v.
Tatham).
38. See Finman, supra note 7, at 689 n.18.
39. See McCormick, supra note 37, at 504 (concluding that conduct, when
offered to show actor's belief, should be admissible if judge finds that action
"so vouched the belief as to give reasonable assurance of trustworthiness").
But see Finman, supra note 7, at 692-93 (agreeing partially with McCormick's
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trable rule may justify accepting some rough edges.
Moreover, the danger of insincerity is absent when the
nonverbal conduct is not intended as an assertion. Admittedly,
the belief that there was no intent to assert, on which the lack
of this danger is premised, may be wrong, and cross-examina-
tion could illuminate the question of intent to assert.4° For ex-
ample, when inferring seaworthiness from the conduct of the
sea captain, the trier might believe that the captain boarded the
ship assuming it safe, when in fact the captain boarded in-
tending to show false confidence in the ship. The literature,
however, lacks any compelling evidence of injustice done by re-
ceiving nonverbal conduct containing concealed assertions. The
opponents of nonverbal conduct have not found their Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh.
Finally, lawyers seldom recognize that a hearsay problem
might exist when nonverbal conduct is offered into evidence.41
Rules excluding nonverbal conduct would be applied sporadi-
cally and arbitrarily. This abiding practical obstacle may be the
strongest reason for not seeking doctrinal refinement.
Wright v. Tatham also illustrates how implied assertions
derived from verbal conduct can involve hearsay dangers. The
use of the letters to Marsden requires an inference from the de-
clarant's statement to the declarant's belief to the truth of the
belief, so use involves reliance on the declarant's credibility.42
One can argue that implied assertions derived from verbal
conduct should be classified as nonhearsay because dangers of
insincerity are reduced by the indirect nature of the inference
drawn. 43 Thus, it does not matter much whether the cousin in
"trustworthiness" criterion, noting that "only in some instances is the actor's
conduct sufficiently important to justify reliance on his uncross-examined
memory and perception").
40. See Finman, supra note 7, at 684-91.
41. See, e.g., Falknor, supra note 8, at 137.
42. The cousin who wrote about the trip to America, for example, had not
seen Marsden for years, and might have been mistaken in his apparent belief
that Marsden was competent. The other writers also may have misperceived
Marsden's mental condition or they may have forgotten incidents that tended
to show Marsden to be incompetent.
43. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(a) justifies treating nonas-
sertive nonverbal conduct as nonhearsay on the ground that "[tihe situations
giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate ques-
tions of sincerity," and then states that "[s]imilar considerations [concerning
reliability] govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is as-
sertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter as-
serted, also excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of
subdivision (c)." FED. R. EVID. 801(a) Advisory Committee Note; see also Mc-
1990]
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Wright v. Tatham accurately described the plague in Alexan-
dria, or whether he exaggerated to make the letter more inter-
esting. In either case, the letter is probative on the issue of
Marsden's mental state because it was written as if to a person
of normal understanding.
Nonetheless, the proposition that insincerity dangers are
reduced by the way the trier will use the utterance is highly de-
batable, especially in the factual situation of Wright v. Tatham.
Suppose the vicar had told a colleague, "Marsden is the
smartest and sanest man in the parish." This direct assertion of
Marsden's competency would be hearsay under the Federal
Rules, although it has no greater danger of being insincere than
the utterance the vicar actually wrote to Marsden. The vicar
would worry about his reputation (and his conscience) if he di-
rectly lied about Marsden. On the other hand, indirectly giving
a false impression is sometimes the proper thing to do. The
vicar, for example, may have thought Marsden was mentally in-
competent, considered this in framing his letter, but ultimately
decided that it would be convenient and polite to pretend Mars-
den was competent and write to him as if he were, knowing
that, in any event, the letter would find its way to responsible
hands.
The facts of Wright v. Tatham illustrate one possible draw-
back of classifying implied assertions as nonhearsay - the dan-
ger of reliance on the declarant's untested credibility. Another
possible danger arises if a formalistic treatment of the differ-
ences between implied and direct assertions means that trivial
differences in the wording of an assertion can yield different
results." The in-court witness might be coached to report the
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 740 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (stating that likeli-
hood of purposeful deception is lessened when an assertion is offered as proof
of something other than the matter asserted). For criticisms of these positions,
see Graham, supra note 15, at 908-09; Wellborn, supra note 7, at 66-67; c. Im-
winkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing the Reliability
of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt - And Quickly Forgotten, 41
FLA. L. REV. 215, 219-30 (1989) (arguing that courts have paid too much atten-
tion to sincerity dangers and not enough to memory dangers).
44. For example, McCormick suggested that a declarant's statement "Har-
old is the finest of my sons" would not be hearsay when offered to show the
declarant's fondness for Harold, while "I care more for Harold than for any of
my children" would be hearsay when offered to show fondness. C. MCCOR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 466 (1st ed. 1954). Under modern
law, this difference in classification, even if accepted, probably would not lead
to a difference in admissibility because "I care more for Harold" would be ad-
missible as a statement of present state of mind. FED. R. EvID. 803(3). One
can imagine situations, however, in which this type of hyperformal analysis
[Vol. 74:783
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statement in such a way as to make it an implied assertion, a
type of false testimony that could be difficult to detect on cross-
examination when the witness was the only one reporting the
statement.
45
The implied assertions contained in the letters in Wright v.
Tatham do not seem any more reliable than a direct assertion.
That does not mean, however, that a hearsay definition that
treated implied assertions as more reliable than direct asser-
tions would be wrong. Any definition that seeks to constrain
trial discretion necessarily will be wrong in some situations.
The question is not whether any possible situation exists in
which the definition would allow dubious evidence to be re-
ceived, but whether in everyday operation it does a capable job
of sorting. Judges apply most rules instantly in the heat of the
courtroom. Moreover, even if unreliable evidence does slip
through a gap in the exclusionary rule, the trier always can re-
ject it.
We have no way of knowing through conventional legal re-
search how the rule operates in everyday use, but the evidence
from published opinions is a better basis than pure speculation
for deciding how it works. Later in this Article, I examine
modern caselaw. First, however, I will consider whether the
Federal Rules really differentiate between the declarant defini-
tion and the assertion definition - that is, whether evidence in-
volving reliance on the declarant's credibility sometimes will
fall outside the truth-of-the-matter-asserted definition endorsed
by Rule 801(c).
C. IMPLIED ASSERTIONS UNDER THE Two DEFINITIONS: THE
LANGUAGE OF THE FEDERAL RULES AND THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTE
The Advisory Committee drafted Rule 801 to exclude
nonassertive nonverbal conduct from the definition of hear-
say.46 Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as an out-of-court "state-
would lead to a difference in admissibility - for example, if it had been ap-
plied in Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923, 927 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 423 U.S.
824 (1975), to admit "[t]he old man won't go up any more" as evidence that the
old man was financing the murder, on the theory that the evidence was not
offered to show that the old man would not pay any more.
45. See Park, 493 F.2d at 928 (Judge Wisdom observing that "the hearsay
rule could easily be circumvented through clever questioning and coaching of
witnesses, so that answers were framed as implied rather than as direct
assertions")
46. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) Advisory Committee's Note (stating that "situa-
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ment" that is "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." 47 Rule 801(a) defines "statement" as "(1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if
it is intended... as an assertion. '48 Thus, nonverbal conduct is
not hearsay unless "intended" as an assertion. The Advisory
Committee's Note explains, moreover, that the burden of prov-
ing conduct is intended as an assertion will rest on the party
opposing admission of the evidence. 49
The Federal Rules also deal, perhaps less clearly, with the
hearsay status of implied assertions derived from verbal con-
duct. The Advisory Committee's Note describes two categories
of verbal conduct that are excluded from the definition of hear-
say by Rule 801(c).50 These two categories are "nonassertive
verbal conduct" and "verbal conduct which is assertive but of-
fered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter
asserted."51 I will consider these two categories in turn and dis-
cuss whether the language of Rule 801(c) necessarily means
that evidence involving hearsay dangers sometimes will be ad-
missible under one category or the other.52
1. Nonassertive Verbal Conduct
No authoritative single definition of the distinction be-
tween assertive and nonassertive verbal conduct exists. Schol-
ars have used the term "nonassertive" to refer to several
different types of verbal conduct.
First, scholars use the concept of nonassertive verbal con-
duct to classify legally operative language as nonhearsay.53 Le-
gally operative language is language that creates or
extinguishes legal rights, powers, or duties.M An example is
the use of the words "I accept your offer" to show acceptance of
a contract offer. Wigmore wrote that such utterances are not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted because they "are
tions giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate
questions of sincerity").
47. FED. R. EvIn. 801(c).
48. FED. R. EviD. 801(a).
49. Id. Advisory Committee's Note.
50. Id.
51. IM
52. Part II of this Article examines more closely federal caselaw since
adoption of Rule 801(c), and determines what position courts have taken on
the issue.
53. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
54. M
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not offered as assertions."55 McCormick's Handbook of the Law
of Evidence takes a similar approach, stating that words of of-
fer and acceptance are "not evidence of assertions offered tes-
timonially."56 The utterances fall within the class of utterances
that J.L. Austin described as "performatives" - words that do
not describe or report anything and are not true or false.5 7
Second, hearsay writers sometimes have placed all utter-
ances that give orders or ask questions in the "nonassertive"
category. Under this construction, only declarative sentences
are assertions. An imperative ("Put $10 on Native Dancer") or
a question ("Is Hector home?") is nonassertive.5 8
55. 6 J. WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMIMON LAW § 1772, at 191 (3d
ed. 1940).
56. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 732-33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
Others have phrased it differently, not directly in terms of the "assertion" lan-
guage in the hearsay definition, but in terms of the concept of offering some-
thing to prove its truth. Lilly states that words of offer and acceptance are not
hearsay because the "proponent only need establish that the operative words
forming the contract were spoken, not that these words were, in any sense,
true." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 6.2, at 184 (2d
ed. 1987). Morgan stated that a contract offer "is offered, not for the purpose
of proving its truth, but merely for the purpose of showing that it was made."
Morgan, A Suggested Classiflication of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31
YALE L.J. 229, 231 (1922).
57. J.L. AusTIN, How TO Do THINGS WIH WoRDs 5-11 (2d ed. 1975). In
fact, Austin observed that:
[I]n the American law of evidence, a report of what someone else
said is admitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance of our
performative kind: because this is regarded as a report not so much of
something he said, as which it would be hear-say and not admissible
as evidence, but rather as something he did, an action of his.
Id at 13 (emphasis added).
58. United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding inter-
cepted call to alleged drug dealer, in which caller asked "Did you get the
stuff?" admissible because a question is not an assertion); United States v.
Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 466 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (stating that "the utterance,
'Put $2 to win on Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico,' is a direction and not an
assertion of any kind, and therefore can be neither true nor false"); S. GOODE,
O.G. WELLBORN III & M.M. SHARLOT, 33 TEXAS PRACTICE, GUIDE TO THE
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 801.2, at 551-52 (1988)
(stating that the utterance "Don't let Dave come in here" is nonassertive, be-
cause it does not state any fact); E. IMVINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN
& F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 128 (1979) (noting that "[b]ecause most as-
sertive statements are declarative sentences, many trial judges use a rule of
thumb that imperative, interrogative, and exclamatory sentences are not hear-
say"; the authors would not follow the "rule of thumb" in all situations); Well-
born, supra note 7, at 71-72 (describing this as the "most plausible" though
"most unattractive" interpretation of Rule 801(c) and its commentary; Profes-
sor Wellborn would amend the rule to change this result, id. at 91-93); see also
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246, at 729-30 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (stating that
"[the contemporary dictionary meaning of 'assert' is to state positively or
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This second use of the concept is highly questionable.
When offered to show that the addressee was speeding, the
question "Why did you go so fast?" poses the same dangers as a
direct declarative sentence. Moreover, questions containing in-
formation always can be broken down into interrogative and
declaratory components. It would be capricious to treat "You
were going so fast. Why?" differently than "why were you go-
ing so fast?" The same can be said of an imperative sentence
such as "Throw that thief out of here!" when offered to show
that the person referred to was a thief. The rulemakers could
not have intended such an arbitrary distinction.
Third, scholars sometimes use the term "nonassertive" as a
shorthand expression for "not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Both McCormick and Falknor thus describe
the letters written to Marsden in Wright v. Tatham as "nonas-
sertive."59 This description imposes on the word "nonassertive"
strongly, and accordingly a person may be described as being assertive. How-
ever, in the world of evidence, the word 'assert' carries no connotation of being
positive or strong. A favorite of writers in the field for at least a century and a
half, the word simply means to say that something is so, e.g. that an event hap-
pened or that a condition existed." (emphasis in original)). cf. Muncie Aviation
Corp. v. PartyDoll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1180, 1182, 1184 (5th Cir. 1975)
(dictum suggesting that FAA recommendations about how to land at uncon-
trolled airports might not be "assertions" when offered to show the standard
of care a pilot should use when landing; court ultimately uses residual excep-
tion of Rule 803(24)); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(a)[02], at 801-63 (1988) (describing verbal conduct of boys in making fun of
testatrix, to show that testatrix lacked mental capacity, as nonassertive; not
clear from description what words were used by the boys). Compare the collo-
quy at trial in United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1984):
MR. SACHS: I object to what Mike asked him. That is hearsay
once again.
MR. CHERTOFF: A question can't possibly be hearsay.
See also Inc. Pub. Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) aff'd, 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986) (case involving consumer confu-
sion testimony; court states that "an inquiry is not an 'assertion"' and hence
cannot be hearsay; correct result but questionable method of reaching
conclusion).
59. See Falknor, supra note 8, at 136 (asserting that if the vicar wrote to
the testator for the purpose of settling the dispute with the latter, rather than
with any idea of expressing his opinion of the testator's sanity, then the vicar's
conduct was "nonassertive"); McCormick, supra note 37, at 502-03 (referring to
the letters in Wright v. Tatham as "words not of assertion, but of action."
(emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 911,
915 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (using "nonassertive" to refer to assertions offered infer-
entially), aff'd in par rev'd in par on other grounds, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.
1983): McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 249, at 591 (E.
Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (stating that use of a statement to show the declarant's
knowledge that brakes were defective is an example of "circumstantial nonas-
sertive use of utterances to show state of mind"; yet a statement such as "the
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a meaning that would be better borne by the Advisory Commit-
tee's other concept of "verbal conduct which is assertive but of-
fered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter
asserted. '60
Hearsay writers also use the word "nonassertive", confus-
ingly, to refer to transactions that are being described in a way
that expunges assertions that were part of the transaction.61
This occurs when the original transaction involved an assertion,
but a witness at trial later describes the transaction without
specifically setting forth the assertion. The trier learns of the
assertion by a process of inference. The inference is necessary
not because the original declarant said nothing or stated the
matter indirectly, but because the later reporter simply has ex-
punged the declarant's assertion. Suppose, for example, a party
offers evidence that P hired W to collect money from D, for the
purpose of showing that D owed the money;62 or offers evi-
dence that John's license was revoked, to show that John was
unfit for employment.63 Some hearsay writers would call these
brakes are bad" clearly would be an assertion if offered to show that the
brakes were bad; hence the cited text seems to embrace a concept of utter-
ances that are assertions but that are used nonassertively); cf United States v.
Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1976) (dictum that notebooks containing
entries about sales of heroin might be considered "nonassertive conduct" when
used to show drug activities were taking place on the premises); MCCORMICK'S
ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 740 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (stating that "Wright v. Ta-
tham ... did not ... involve nonassertive conduct; it involved conduct that
was, in a measure at least, assertive"); See generally R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS,
supra note 15, at 321-22 (stating that "[w]e use the term nonassertive to de-
scribe the verbal conduct in Wight both because it is a convenient shorthand
and because the term is frequently used to describe the evidence in Wright
and similar cases," but noting perceptively that "the term is technically inaccu-
rate and potentially misleading. Almost every verbalization is a manifestation
of an intent to assert something .... ).
60. Consider the utterances set forth in the Wright v. Tatham letters.
The cousin wrote of a plague in Alexandria, that he had received the map of
America, and that his aunt was sick. The vicar said that disagreeable things
would happen if Marsden did not settle. Had the letters been offered to prove
the truth of the factual propositions set forth in their text, any court would
have considered them assertions. It seems more consistent with ordinary usage
to speak of the letters in Wright v. Tatham as assertions used to prove some-
thing other than the matter asserted, instead of characterizing them as "nonas-
sertive" because of the use to which they were being put.
61. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
62. J. KAPLAN & J. WALTz, CASES AND MATERILS ON EVIDENCE 129 (6th
ed. 1987) (citing E. Morgan, Evidence Exam, Summer Term 1946, Harvard Law
School).
63. McCormick, supra note 37, at 491. For a case in which the court suc-
cessfully saw through an expunged assertion, see United States v. Brown, 548
F2d 1194, 1204-06 (5th Cir. 1977). Brown was a tax return preparer charged
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evidentiary uses "nonassertive."64 The person who hired the
bill collector, however, must have told the collector that money
was owed, and the license revocation must have been accompa-
nied by some sort of verbal utterance.65
Some uses of the concept of nonassertive verbal conduct
described above involve giving the assertion definition of hear-
say a different meaning than the declarant definition.66 Yet
none of these uses is dictated by anything inherent in the con-
cept of "assertive." Certainly the concept of nonassertive ver-
bal conduct could be restricted, consistent with Rule 801(a)-(c),
to instances in which the conduct was offered as legally opera-
tive language - to show what it did, not what it said. If re-
stricted in this way, the fact that Rule 801(a)-(c) creates a
with tax fraud. At trial, the government offered, and the district court re-
ceived, testimony by an Internal Revenue Service agent who had audited a
number of returns prepared by the defendant. She testified that 90% to 95%
of these returns overstated itemized deductions. Citing Morgan, supra note 15,
and noting the presence of hearsay dangers, the Fifth Circuit reversed.
Brown, 548 F.2d at 1205-06 & n.19. The court stated that the agent's testimony
inescapably implied that the agent had gotten information from talking to
others, probably the taxpayers whose returns had been prepared. d. at 1205
n.20. It should be noted that although the testimony in a case like Brown
might be characterized as containing an "implied assertion," the implied asser-
tion problem is not the same as the one addressed in this Article. In Brown,
the form of the witness' testimony created an implied assertion, not the form
of the declarant's original statement. This Article concerns only the latter
type of implied assertion. In the author's opinion, Brown should have been de-
cided the same way whatever view one takes of the implied assertion problem
or of the desirability of an assertion or declarant definition.
64. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 740 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
65. As Professors Allen and Kuhns have written,
It may well be that the person who engaged in the paperwork that
officially revoked John's license was not trying to assert anything
about how John drives. Nonetheless, the revocation is occurring only
because somebody - presumably the judge who found John guilty of
a traffic offense - asserted that John engaged in some illegal driving
activity.
R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, supra note 15, at 331-32.
The utterances described involve legally operative language (hiring and
revoking), but the legally operative language is offered for what it says, not for
what it does. When legally operative language is offered to show something
other than the legal relationship it creates, it is hearsay. For example, allega-
tions in pleadings are legally operative; they define the controversy. Pleadings
are hearsay, however, when offered to prove the truth of the assertions con-
tained in them. The license revocation and hiring utterances described in the
text are comparable to judgments offered to prove a fact essential to the judg-
ment. When offered for this purpose, the judgment is hearsay, and it needs
the aid of an exception to find its way into evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22)
(hearsay exception for judgment of previous conviction when specified re-
quirements are met).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65.
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category of nonhearsay called nonassertive verbal conduct
would not lead to a functional difference between the declarant
and assertion definitions of hearsay.
2. Verbal conduct that is assertive but offered as a basis for
inferring something other than the matter asserted
Whatever the definition of assertion, the rules clearly treat
some assertions as nonhearsay. The Advisory Committee's cat-
egory of "verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a ba-
sis for inferring something other than the matter asserted"
leads to this result.6 7 The language of Rule 801(c) about "of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted"
would be superfluous if all assertions were hearsay.6
8
The category of assertions that are offered to prove a mat-
ter other than the proposition that they assert, or "assertion[s]
used inferentially,"69 would be arbitrary if one used a purely
formal approach to deciding whether an assertion is offered to
prove the truth of what it asserts. The concept should be inter-
preted in a way that at least leaves some chance that the utter-
ances classified as hearsay and nonhearsay under the concept
will be different functionally, that is, different in the dangers
they present. Assertions made metaphorically, sarcastically, or
in some other non-literal form, therefore, should be considered
hearsay. For example, "Well, I never forged a kinsman's will!"
would be hearsay when offered to show that the addressee was
a forger, if the context indicated that the declarant intended ac-
cusation.70 Similarly, "The sky is on fire" would be hearsay if
offered to show that the declarant had seen a sunset,71 and
"Your hands are dirty" would be hearsay when offered as a
metaphorical accusation of guilt. When use of the utterance in
court requires that the trier assume the declarant intended to
assert the proposition that the utterance is being offered to
prove, then the utterance must be treated as hearsay, even if its
surface form is different because the statement is sarcastic,
67. FED. R. EvID. 801 (a) Advisory Committee Note.
68. FED. R. EvID. 801(c). If all assertions were hearsay, then Rule 801(c)
should read merely that" 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing." The word "statement" is de-
fined in Rule 801(a) in a fashion that covers only assertions. FED. R. EVID.
801(a).
69. The useful term "assertions used inferentially" was coined in Well-
born, supra note 7, at 65.
70. The example comes from Morgan, supra note 15, at 189.
71. The example is from Comment, Hearsay: The Threshold Question, 9
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1, 14 n.48 (1976).
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metaphorical, or veiled. Similarly, "It will stop raining in an
hour" is hearsay not only when used for the assertion that it
will stop raining, but also when used to show that it is cur-
rently raining.72
A number of scholars have advocated using the declarant's
intent, or some objective manifestation of it, in determining
what the declarant's statement asserts.73 Some version of an
intent test seems necessary to keep the assertion definition
from being wholly arbitrary. Use of such a test will narrow the
difference between the assertion definition and the declarant
definition.
An intent-based approach will not force the trial judge to
decide a difficult or unguided preliminary question of fact, be-
cause the trial judge need not determine actual intent. Instead,
the trial judge would determine what inferences the trier
would need to draw from the declarant's statement for the
statement to help its proponent. If helpfulness depends on the
trier's belief that the declarant intended to assert a fact that
supports the proponent's case, then the court should consider
the statement hearsay under the truth-of-the-matter-asserted
definition. Under this approach, the statement "At least I
didn't forge a will," offered on the theory that the declarant in-
tended to accuse someone else of forging a will, is hearsay if the
accusation helped the proponent's case. This result makes
sense because no difference in hearsay dangers exists between a
direct and an indirect accusation.7 4 Under this approach, there-
fore, the court does not determine actual intent. Instead, it
traces the path the trier would take in drawing inferences
favorable to the proponent.
Under an intent-based approach the assertion definition
still differs from the declarant definition. The concept of "in-
tended assertion" should not be interpreted to give the words
"truth of the matter asserted" a bizarre meaning. For example,
it would violate ordinary conventions of language to say that
72. The example is from Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26
HARv. L. REV. 146, 150 n.13 (1912).
73. See, e.g., Ball, The Changing Shape of the Hearsay Rule, 38 ALA. LAW
502, 506-07 (1977) (arguing that the declarant's intent determines what words
assert and that whenever individuals realize the implications of their words,
they intend to assert those implications).
74. In contrast, the statement "Robert was home with me all day Satur-
day," offered as a falsehood to show the declarant's consciousness of Robert's
guilt, would not be hearsay under the suggested approach. The trier is not
asked to infer that the declarant intended to assert the matter the proponent
seeks to establish (that Robert was guilty).
[Vol. 74:783
IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY
the letters in Wright v. Tatham are offered to prove the truth
of what they assert. When the cousin's statement of a plague in
Alexandria is offered to prove that Marsden is competent to
make a will,75 the proposition asserted is so different from the
proposition to be proven that it should be considered nonhear-
say under the assertion definition. Even if the definition is
glossed with an intent-based test, the statement is nonhearsay.
One need not assume that the declarants intended to say any-
thing about Marsden's competency to use their letters as evi-
dence of competency.
An even more dramatic example is the utterance offered as
a falsehood to show the declarant's consciousness of guilt. For
example, suppose a suspect denies knowing another suspect.
The prosecution can prove the suspects have known each other
for years, and offers the false denial against both suspects as ev-
idence of the declarant's consciousness of their joint guilt.76 To
say the utterance is offered "to prove the truth of the matter
asserted" is to give those words a meaning they will not bear.
Use of the utterances in evidence, however, even to prove the
falsity of what they assert, involves relying on declarant's credi-
bility and accepting some hearsay dangers.77
A final basis for recognizing a difference between the two
definitions is the Advisory Committee's Note, which contem-
plates that verbal conduct sometimes will be nonhearsay even
though it involves hearsay dangers.78 Respect for language con-
ventions and for the intent of the Advisory Committee both
point toward accepting the proposition that, under the Federal
Rules, some verbal conduct will be accepted as nonhearsay
even though it depends for value on the credibility of the
declarant.79
75. Wright v. Tatham, 7 Adolph & E. at 317-18, 112 Eng. Rep. at 490-91.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
77. See text accompanying infra notes 106-07.
78. See text accompanying supra notes 50-51.
79. For a carefully considered view that differs from mine, see Graham,
supra note 15, at 887. Professor Graham maintains that Rule 801(c) can, and
should, be interpreted to reach the same result as Wright v. Tatham in its
treatment of verbal implied assertions. As Professor Graham skillfully dem-
onstrates, in many cases in which the declarant has expressed an idea indi-
rectly, one can reach this result by treating an idea that the declarant intended
to assert as part of the "matter asserted" within the meaning of Rule 801(c).
See id at 921 n.75 (offering three illustrations of this argument). This reliance
on the declarant's intent, however, does not make Rule 801(c) consistent with
the declarant definition in all situations. For example, when an utterance is
offered as a falsehood to show consciousness of guilt, the declarant had no in-
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II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF IMPLIED ASSERTIONS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
I have argued, primarily on the basis of the language of
Rule 801(c) and the Advisory Committee Note, that the declar-
ant definition of hearsay differs from the assertion definition,
and that the assertion definition can lead to classification as
nonhearsay of statements that depend for value on the credibil-
ity of the declarant8 0 I will now test these claims by reviewing
Rule 801(c) caselaw.
My research focused on two types of cases. First, I sought
cases in which verbal conduct involving hearsay dangers was
classified as nonhearsay because it was nonassertive or was not
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' Second, I
looked for cases taking the opposite approach, in which a plau-
sible argument could be made that verbal conduct was nonas-
sertive or was not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, but in which the court nevertheless classified the con-
duct as hearsay. 2 An examination of these two types of im-
plied assertion cases should demonstrate the effect of using the
truth-of-the-matter-asserted definition of hearsay.8 3
The implied assertion problem has not been nearly as im-
portant to judges as it has been to hearsay scholars. Courts
rarely write expressly about whether implied assertions are
hearsay, whether the doctrine of Wright v. Tatham survived
adoption of the Federal Rules, or whether a statement that de-
pends for value on the declarant's credibility should be treated
as hearsay even when offered to prove a matter other than
what the statement directly asserts.8 4
tent to assert guilt. In any event, as Professor Graham recognizes, his ap-
proach involves rejection of the Advisory Committee's apparent intent.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 46-79.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 142-220.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 85-141.
83. I searched only for cases dealing with implied assertions drawn from
verbal conduct, not for cases involving nonverbal conduct. My goal was to ex-
amine implied assertion issues in areas the Federal Rules left open. The ques-
tion whether nonassertive nonverbal conduct is hearsay was definitively
settled by the rulemakers in favor of treating the conduct as nonhearsay. FED.
R. EVID. 801(a).
84. Scholsrs familiar with hearsay literature have remarked on courts'
lack of attention to the definitional issue this Article addresses. See, e.g., J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 58, 801(a)[01], at 801-56 (noting that
Wright v. Tatham is the exception to the dearth of judicial attention).
Moreover, a computer-aided caselaw search reveals that courts hardly
ever use the phrases that virtually always would be associated with a full dis-
cussion of that issue. Consider Wright v. Tatham, the case that presents the
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The caselaw did throw some light, however, on what judges
have done with implied assertions. I will describe the caselaw,
and then comment on how the Rule 801(c) definition has influ-
enced treatment of implied assertions.
A. CASES TREATING IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY
In the work product of the few federal courts that have
core example of the implied assertion problem, that sometimes is used as a
name for the problem itself, and that is considered an indispensable starting
point for treatises, casebooks, and articles discussing the problem. I know of
no casebook on evidence that does not at least cite Wright v. Tatham. See J.
FRIEDENTHAL & M. SINGER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 84-85 (1985); E. GREEN &
C. NESSON, PROBLEIS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 286 (1983); J.
KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, supra note 62, at 105-07; P. RICE, EVIDENCE: COAIMON
LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 4.01, at 224-28 (1987); P. ROTHSTEIN,
EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS § 2.02, at 19-22 (1986); J. WEIN-
STEIN, J. MANSFIELD & M. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 613-
17 (8th ed. 1988). For examples of treatise and hornbook treatments, see MC-
CORMuCK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 250, at 737-38 (E. Cleary 3d
ed. 1984); G. LILLY, supra note 56, § 6.3, at 195 (2d ed. 1987); 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 58, 01(a) [01], at 801-56 to -57; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note
13, § 267, at 93.
Since 1945, the words "Wright v. Tatham" appear in only five of the 12,876
federal cases that refer to hearsay. This figure comes from a WESTLAW
search of the ALLFEDS file performed August 21, 1989. Only two of the cases
retrieved were decided after enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975.
The phrase "implied assertion(s)" has appeared as part of a hearsay dis-
cussion in only 14 federal cases in the years 1945-89, and usually the reference
is cursory. It appears within 100 words of "hearsay" in 14 cases in the
WESTLAW ALLFEDS library, which contains 12,876 cases referring to hear-
say (search of August 21, 1989). "Implied assertion(s)" appears within 100
words of the word "hearsay" in 11 cases in the LEXIS CTAPP library, which
contains 8,853 cases referring to hearsay (search of August 20, 1989). It is pos-
sible, but in my view unlikely, that some implied assertion hearsay cases in the
relevant library were missed by the proximity restrictions on these searches; I
inserted the restrictions because "implied assertion" sometimes appears in a
nonhearsay context.
The figures for "nonassertive" and "hearsay dangers" also are low, and
most occurrences of those phrases appear in cases that do not discuss the im-
plied assertion problem. The phrase "hearsay dangers" appears in 49 cases in
the WESTLAW ALLFEDS library; the overwhelming majority concern some-
thing other than the implied assertion problem (search of August 21, 1989).
The phrase "triangulating hearsay" appears in five cases in the LEXIS CTAPP
file (search of August 20, 1989); none involve discussions of the problem now
under consideration.
I am not sure why courts so rarely discuss implied assertions. Perhaps
judges are reluctant to lose themselves in this evidence teachers' briar patch,
and would rather spend energy on the great issues of the day. Perhaps judges
and lawyers trying to get good evidence past hearsay barriers find it easier to
go through one of the familiar exceptions than to navigate the territory of im-
plied assertions.
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carefully considered the implied assertion controversy, four
opinions interpret the definition set forth in Rule 801(c) to be
consistent with the treatment of verbal conduct in Wright v.
Tatham.8 5 Two of these cases were decided after enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 6
In United States v. Reynolds,8 7 the Third Circuit expressly
endorsed the Wright v. Tatham position.8 8 When postal inspec-
tors arrested Reynolds on the street, Parran, who was nearby,
then approached the group.8 9 Reynolds then said to Parran, in
the presence of the arresting officers, "I didn't tell them any-
thing about you."' ° The trial judge admitted the statement
against Parran as evidence of Parran's guilt of the crime
charged.9 1 On appeal, the government argued that the evidence
was admissible against Parran because the statement "I didn't
tell them anything about you" was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.92 In a thoughtful opinion, Judge
Leon Higginbotham rejected this position, holding admission of
the statement reversible error.93 The court's interpretation of
Rule 801(c) seems to require classification as hearsay of all
statements that depend for value on credibility.9 4
85. Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Reyn-
olds, 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983); Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (1974), withdrawn
on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 423 U.S. 824
(1975); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974). I have not included in my count a borderline case, United States v.
Barash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.). Barash was a bribery case in
which the government offered into evidence the testimony of an IRS agent
who stated that he had been introduced to defendant by L, and that L "had
never introduced me to anyone except someone who was going to pay me off."
Id at 399. Citing Wright v. Tatham, the court stated that the evidence should
not have been admitted. Id. Whether Barash belongs in the category of cases
that I was searching for depends on whether one regards the introduction to
be verbal conduct or nonverbal conduct. I was searching only for verbal con-
duct cases.
86. Lyle, 720 F.2d at 426; Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 99.
87. 715 F.2d at 99.
88. 1d at 103.
89. IM at 101.
90. Id,
91. Id- at 100.
92. Id, at 102-03.
93. Id, at 104.
94. See id. at 103. The court noted that "statements containing express as-
sertions also may contain implied assertions qualifying as hearsay" and indi-
cated that implied assertions can be hearsay even when "'the matter which
the declarant intends to assert is different from the matter to be proven.' "Id.
(quoting 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MuELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 415, at 94 n.84
(1980)). On the facts before it, the court states:
As the government uses it, the statement's probative value depends
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If, as Reynolds suggests, the assertion definition classifies a
statement as hearsay whenever the statement's relevance de-
pends on assuming the truth of a fact the statement implies,
then the assertion definition would be functionally identical to
the declarant definition,95 at least in situations in which the
verbal conduct is deemed a "statement."
In Lyle v. Koehler,96 the Sixth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion.97 The case arose from the joint murder trial of Lyle
and Kemp in state court. While in pretrial detention, Kemp
wrote two letters to friends asking them to testify to an alibi.
He gave the letters to his sister for delivery, but law enforce-
ment officials intercepted them.98 The letters instructed the
addressees in great detail about the alibi testimony Kemp
wanted them to give. 9 The addressees also were instructed to
destroy the letters so that they would not fall into the wrong
hands.10 0 One letter asked the addressee to say that both Kemp
(the declarant) and Lyle (Kemp's codefendant) were at the ad-
dressee's house at the time of the murder. 0 1 Both letters asked
the addressees to tell investigators that neither Lyle nor Kemp
knew a third suspect.'0 2 The letters were clearly an attempt to
get the addressees to testify to a false alibi that would exoner-
ate both Kemp and Lyle.
on the truth of an assumed fact it implies. Unless the trier assumes
that the statement implies that Reynolds did not tell the postal in-
spectors that Parran was involved in the conspiracy to defraud, even
though Parran was in fact involved, the statement carries no proba-
tive weight for the government's case. For if the trier assumes that
the statement implied that Reynolds did not tell the postal inspectors
that Parran was involved because there was nothing to tell, the state-
ment has no relevance to the government's case. Its only relevance to
the government's case is tied to an assumed fact of petitioner's guilt
that the government argues the utterance proves.
Id (citation omitted).
95. The result might be different if the word "implied" in Reynolds were
read to mean "intentionally implied" as opposed to "giving rise to an infer-
ence." The Reynolds opinion, however, in discussing the utterance, apparently
assumed that the declarant did not intend to assert guilt with the utterance.
See id at 103 (quoting commentator to effect that when "the matter which the
declarant intends to assert is different from the matter to be proved," the
hearsay objection still applies (quoting 4 D. LOUisELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 94, at 94 n.84)).
96. 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983) (Merritt, J.).
97. Id at 433.
98. Id at 429.
99. Id. at 429-31.
100. Id. at 430-31.
101. Id at 429.
102. Id. at 430.
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The prosecution offered the letters into evidence at trial,
on the theory that the attempt to set up a false alibi showed
consciousness of guilt.'0 3 On habeas petition to federal court,
Lyle claimed violation of the right to confrontation. 04 The fed-
eral court analyzed whether the evidence was hearsay, assum-
ing that if it was not hearsay, no confrontation issue would
arise.10 5 The court adopted Morgan's 1948 view of the dimen-
sions of hearsay, 10 6 stating that "[u]nder Morgan's view, the in-
ference of Kemp's guilty mind, as reflected in the letters, is not
severable from Kemp's raw statements; the letters accordingly
present a hearsay problem."'1 7 The court noted that the jury
would treat the letters as incriminating Lyle as well as Kemp
because of the close association between Lyle and Kemp as
shown by their simultaneous arrest shortly after the
murders.'08 The court viewed this use of hearsay as a violation
of the right to confrontation. 0 9
Two cases decided before enactment of the Federal Rules
also deserve description."0° They are likely to remain influen-
tial, to the degree any implied assertion case is influential, be-
cause few courts seem to believe Rule 801(c) changed the
common law definition of hearsay. This conclusion is under-
standable because the rule's familiar truth-of-the-matter-as-
serted language often was used at common law."' The cases
103. Id at 432.
104. Id. at 431.
105. I& at 431-33.
106. See Morgan, supra note 15, at 207-08; cf Morgan, Hearsay, 25 MIss.
L.J. 1, 8 (1953) (modifying views).
107. Lyle, 720 F.2d at 431-35 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 434.
109. Id. at 433. For a case that seems to reach a different result from Lyle,
but without nearly the degree of discussion and consideration, see United
States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 109 S. Ct.
65 (1988). Perholtz involved a dispute over the evidentiary status of a "script"
that a co-conspirator gave another co-conspirator to memorize. The "script"
gave an exculpatory explanation of the role the co-conspirator had played in
various transactions. Id. at 351. The appellate court stated that the "script" was
produced during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and there-
fore was admissible as a statement of a co-conspirator. Id. at 357. The court,
however, gave as an "additional reason" for admission the theory that "the
script is not hearsay because it is not being 'offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter[s] asserted.'" Id. at 357.
110. Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975): United States v. Pacelli,
491 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1984).
111. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 184 F.2d 802, 813 (9th
Cir. 1950); Terry v. United States, 51 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1931); Wheaton,
What is Hearsay?, 46 IowA L. REV. 210, 211 (1961).
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came from panels of the Second and Fifth Circuits, and both
reached results consistent with Wright v. Tatham.
In United States v. Pacelli,12 Pacelli was accused of killing
Patsy Parks, a potential witness against Pacelli.113 The govern-
ment offered testimony of an informant who had been at a
gathering of some of Pacelli's friends and relatives.1 4 The in-
formant testified about statements Pacelli's friends and family
members made shortly after Pacelli's arrest. The statements
indicated indirectly that the declarants believed Pacelli had
committed the murder."i 5 For example, the informer testified
that Pacelli's wife told him that Parks's body had been found
and that Pacelli was in custody,"i6 and also testified that one of
the people at the gathering said "that there is a million places
to put a body and you don't have to ... burn it up and leave it
laying right out in the middle of nowhere for people to find.""i 7
The informant's testimony was offered as evidence that the
persons present believed Pacelli to be guilty, for the further in-
ference that he was in fact guilty." 8
The argument that the statement was not hearsay is at
least plausible. The government was not trying to prove that
there are a million places to put a body, so one could argue that
the statement was not offered for its truth. The court classified
the evidence as hearsay, however, citing and adopting the argu-
ments of Finmani i 9 and Morgan. 20
Judge Wisdom reached a similar result in Park v. Huff.'2
112. 491 F.2d at 1108.
113. Id. at 1110-11.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1111.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The prosecution argued on appeal that
[t]he fact that Pacelli's wife, uncle, and close friends were discussing
at that meeting that the murder had been bungled by leaving the
body where it could easily be found - rather than that Pacelli had
been remanded for something he had not done - is strongly indica-
tive that they knew that Pacelli caused Patsy Parks' death.
Id. at 1115.
119. See Id. at 1116 (citing Finman, supra note 7, at 684).
120. Id. (citing Morgan, supra note 15, at 215). In reasoning that will be
familiar to those who have read the scholarly literature on implied assertions,
the court stated, "[w]hile the danger of insincerity may be reduced where im-
plied rather than express assertions of the third parties are involved,... there
is the added danger of misinterpretation of the declarant's belief. Moreover,
the declarant's opportunity and capacity for accurate perception or his sources
of information remain of crucial importance." Id. at 1117 (citations omitted).
121. 493 F.2d at 923 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.)
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The prosecution in Park offered in evidence certain statements
by Park's associates indicating that Park was the financial an-
gel behind a conspiracy to murder a state prosecutor. 22 Judge
Wisdom declared the statements hearsay, citing with approval
Wright v. Tatham,123 Finman,124 Morgan, 25 and the recently
decided Pacelli case. 2 6
Although Park v. Huff can be interpreted as accepting the
declarant definition, the opinion suggests a middle position be-
tween the declarant and assertion definitions. According to
Park, statements relying on credibility are hearsay when there
is a "possibility that the declarant intended to leave a particular
impression.' ' 2 7 Such statements are not hearsay, however,
when the declarant did not intend to convey the message the
trier is asked to draw from the statement.1-s
(en bane), cert denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975). This case was decided while Rule
801 was pending, and although Judge Wisdom cited and quoted the Rule, id. at
927, it is not clear that he regarded the decision as an interpretation of it.
122. Id- at 927-28.
123. Id at 928 (citing Wright v. Tatham).
124. Id at 927 (citing Finman, supra note 7, at 686).
125. Id (citing Morgan, supra note 15, at 218). Judge Wisdom wrote:
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Morgan analyzed the hearsay rule
and identified its rationale as based on the untrustworthiness of hear-
say statements: "[S]hould we not recognize that the rational basis for
the hearsay classification is not the formula, 'assertions offered for
the truth of the matter asserted,' but rather the presence of substan-
tial risks of insincerity and faulty narration, memory, and
perception?'"
Id. (citing Morgan, supra note 15, at 218).
126. Id (citing Pacelli, 491 F.2d at 1116). Judge Wisdom said:
Implied assertions may in certain circumstances carry less danger of
insincerity or untrustworthiness than direct assertions .. but not al-
ways. The danger of insincerity or untrustworthiness is decreased
only where there is no possibility that the declarant intended to leave
a particular impression.
Id,
When the possibility is real that an out-of-court statement which im-
plies the existence of the ultimate fact in issue was made with asser-
tive intent, it is essential that the statement be treated as hearsay if a
direct declaration of that fact would be so treated.
Id. at 928 (citing Park, 493 F.2d at 927-28).
127. Id. at 927.
128. Id. Also, the statements involved in Park easily could have been seen
as direct assertions of Park's involvement. At the least, they were so close to
being direct assertions that any analysis taking into account what the declar-
ant apparently intended to assert, as well as the declarant's literal words,
would classify the statements as hearsay even under the assertion definition.
For example, one of Park's lieutenants stated that "the old man" (Park)
would not "go up any more" - that is, would not pay anything more to have
the murder committed. Id. at 926. Although the assertion was not offered to
show that in fact Park would not have paid more, it was offered to prove the
[Vol. 74:783
IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY
A number of other cases, without expressly discussing the
implied assertion controversy, silently support the proposition
that implied assertions are hearsay. 2 9 These are cases in which
a reasonable argument could have been made, based on the
form of the utterance, that the utterance was not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. The most important
cases in this category are two from the Supreme Court: Dutton
v. Evans 30 and Krulewitch v. United States. 31
In Dutton v. Evans, the Supreme Court dealt with a con-
frontation clause challenge to a statement admitted under
Georgia's co-conspirator exception. 32 An arrested co-conspira-
tor allegedly told a jailhouse informer: "If it hadn't been for
that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this
now."' 33 The statement was offered as evidence of Evans's
guilt. 3 4 The Supreme Court indicated the statement was hear-
say, but held that receiving the hearsay evidence did not violate
the confrontation clause.' 35 The Reynolds court later concluded
that "Dutton is a clear instance of the Supreme Court recogniz-
ing that a statement's implied assertion can constitute
hearsay."'136
In Krulewitch, the defendant was accused of transporting a
woman across state lines for immoral purposes. 37 The prosecu-
tion offered into evidence the post-arrest statement of an al-
leged co-conspirator, whose conversation with the victim,
according to the victim's testimony, went as follows:
truth of one of the facts the declarant must have intended to convey with the
statement - that Park was the person paying for the murder.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 678 (2d Cir. 1978) (re-
jecting agent's testimony about instructions he gave to informer as hearsay be-
cause it indirectly revealed what defendant had said to informer); United
States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). But see United
States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding verbal conduct of X
- talking on the telephone in a manner indicating that Y was on other end of
the line - admissible as "nonassertive" nonhearsay evidence of Y's participa-
tion in drug conspiracy); infra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing
Perez).
130. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
131. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
132. 400 U.S. at 74.
133. Id. at 77.
134. Id at 88.
135. I
136. 715 F.2d at 104 (reasoning that "[a]lthough the express assertion of the
co-conspirator's statement in Dutton is that the co-conspirator would not be in
this situation but for Alex Evans, the statement was offered as circumstantial
evidence to prove that Evans committed the murder").
137. 336 U.S. at 441.
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She [the co-conspirator] asked me, she says, 'You didn't talk yet?"
And I says, "No." And she says, "Well, don't," she says, "until we get
you a lawyer." And then she says, "Be very careful what you say."
And I can't put it in exact words. But she said, "It would be better for
us two girls to take the blame than Kay (the defendant) because he
couldn't stand it, he couldn't stand to take it.' 138
A plausible argument could be made that the statements were
not assertions offered for their truth. "He couldn't stand to
take it" could be viewed as an assertion offered inferentially;
"You didn't talk yet?" and "Well, don't" might be classed as
nonassertive on the ground that questions and directions are
not assertions. 39 The Court made no reference to these possi-
ble arguments. It based its analysis on the co-conspirator ex-
ception, which it found inapplicable in this case because the
conspiracy had terminated.140
Although Krulewitch is suggestive at most, and although it
was decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence were
adopted, it has been influential in later cases that expressly
adopt the Wright v. Tatham position on implied assertions.141
B. CASES TREATING IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS NONHEARSAY
1. Explicit Cases
A few courts have expressly recognized the implied asser-
tion controversy that scholars debate, and have reached a posi-
tion opposing Wright v. Tatham.14 They have assigned a
nonhearsay label to evidence that depends for value on ac-
cepting an unstated belief of the declarant, and that therefore
raises hearsay dangers because it depends for value on the de-
clarant's credibility. United States v. Zenni 143 is the leading
case taking this position.
In Zenni, government agents, while searching the premises
of a suspected bookmaker, answered calls from unknown per-
sons who gave directions for placing bets.' 44 The intercepted
138. Id-
139. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
140. 336 U.S. at 442.
141. See Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 104 (relying on Krulewitch); Park 493 F.2d at
928-30 (same); Pacelli, 491 F.2d at 1116 (quoting language from Krulewitch and
noting that it was a case in which the court deemed an implied assertion to be
hearsay); see also Wellborn, supra note 7, at 69 (noting the possibility that the
utterances in Krulewitch could have been classified as nonassertive verbal con-
duct and as assertions offered inferentially, and pointing out that nonetheless
no one suggested they were not hearsay).
142. See infra notes 143-72 and accompanying text.
143. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
144. Id. at 465.
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calls were offered in evidence as proof that the occupant of the
premises was a bookmaker. 45 Unlike most opinions admitting
implied assertions, Zenni fully discusses the issue. The court
described Wright v. Tatham and the implied assertions contro-
versy, stating the two opposing positions. 46 It based its
nonhearsay classification on the language of Rule 801(c), stating
that "assertion," although undefined in the Rules, means a
"positive declaration' 47 as opposed to a "direction."''z4 Thus, a
statement such as "Put $2 to win on Paul Revere in the third at
Pimlico" is not hearsay because it is "a direction and not an as-
sertion of any kind, and therefore can be neither true nor
false."' 49
Zenni stands as a landmark for any court wishing to con-
clude that the Federal Rules assertion definition leads to a dif-
ferent result from Wright v. Tatham and the declarant
definition. 50 Although Zenni is unusual in the length and
depth of its discussion of the hearsay definition problem, it is
not at all unusual in its disposition of the particular situation
before it. It heads a long line of cases holding that intercepted
calls are admissible as nonhearsay when offered to show that
the person the caller sought to reach was engaged in illegal
activity.151
145. Id.
146. I& at 466-67.
147. Id. 468.
148. Id at 466 n.7.
149. Id. The court also relied on language in the Advisory Committee Note
indicating that "nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is asser-
tive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter as-
serted" is not hearsay, even though these varieties of verbal conduct might
involve some (reduced) hearsay dangers. Id. at 469.
150. Zenni is also a case in which the hearsay dangers were minimal, see
Morgan, supra note 15, at 198, so the court had a strong a priori inclination to
admit the evidence. It is of course possible that the callers were engaged in a
plot to frame the defendant, or that they all had the wrong number, or that
they were speaking in code about some other kind of transaction, but the
chances are comfortably small, especially because the agent intercepted multi-
ple calls. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 465.
151. See United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 208, 212-13 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1989) (holding that taped messages from third persons on
accused cocaine dealer's answering machine, containing orders for "pita bread"
and "chicken" were not hearsay when offered to show that accused was en-
gaged in distributing cocaine; the coded messages were "not offered to prove
the truth of the matters asserted therein and were admissible to prove that
the statements were in fact made, in order to show that it was more likely
than not that the cocaine possessed by Giraldo was possessed for purposes of
distribution"); State v. Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210, 214-15, 70 A.2d 118, 120 (1949)
(holding calls attempting to place bets not hearsay); Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Another case recognizing the implied assertion contro-
versy, at least to the point of saying that "[t]oday, even implied
assertions are admissible,"1 52 arguing that implied assertions
lack sincerity dangers,153 and citing Zenni,15 is United States v.
Groce.155 Just as Wright v. Tatham illustrates that sometimes
reception of implied assertions involves serious hearsay risks,
so Groce shows forcefully that sometimes the lack of sincerity
dangers makes admission of the evidence irresistibly attractive.
In Groce, the government offered into evidence pencil
markings of nautical "fixes" on a marijuana ship's chart, for the
purpose of showing that the ship, which had been boarded in
international waters, was headed for the United States.156 The
use of the evidence required reliance on the belief of the person
making the chart, so hearsay dangers were present to some de-
gree. But the chance that someone on board prepared a chart
with intent to show that the ship was headed for the United
States when it was not seems so farfetched as to be negligible,
and so does any other insincerity danger one can imagine under
the circumstances.157
578, 591 (Fla. 1958) (holding admissible testimony of telephone conversations
between sheriff and callers who wished to place bets "as evidence of a 'verbal
fact' going to prove the nature of the illegal business" as opposed to the "truth
of any alleged fact" that might have been discussed in the conversation; noting
that such conversations consistently have been admitted by other courts);
Courtney v. State, 187 Md. 1, 5-6, 48 A.2d 430, 432 (1946)(evidence of telephone
calls attempting to place bets during raid held admissible on "res gestae" the-
ory); State v. White, 107 R. I. 306, 309, 267 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1970) (holding tes-
timony of telephone calls received during raid not hearsay because not
admitted to prove the truth of the assertion that the caller desired to place a
bet, but "rather to prove that the telephone located in the raided premises was
used for the purpose of recording bets"); Herndon v. State, 543 S.W.2d 109, 119
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (holding admissible testimony as to telephone calls re-
ceived by officer during raid because issue is whether the calls were made, and
not their truth or falsity); see also Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of
Fact of Making or Receiving Telephone Calls, 13 A.L.R. 2d 1409 (1950 & supp.
1988) (reviewing cases). But see People v. Scalzi, 126 Cal. App. 3d 901, 905-06,
179 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62-64 (1981) (finding error in admitting telephone conversa-
tion intercepted by police officer after arresting drug defendant). The most
important practical difference between Scalzi and the cases cited above is that
in Scalzi only one telephone call was received, so the hearsay statements did
not corroborate each other.
152. United States v. Groce, 682 F.2d 1359, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
153. Id,
154. Id. (citing Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 464).
155. 682 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982).
156. Id. at 1363.
157. Other cases that seem to show awareness of the implied assertion con-
troversy and that choose to admit implied assertions include State v. Carrillo,
156 Ariz. 120, 124, 750 P.2d 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding statement by mur-
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The court in United States v. Perez'5 also expressly admit-
ted implied assertions. At least, the court's opinion expressly
stated that implied assertions are not hearsay 59 quoted the por-
tion of the Advisory Committee's Note that explains the ration-
ale for admitting them,160 and quoted language about implied
assertions from a scholarly article on hearsay.16' The court's
treatment of the problem, however, was cursory - perhaps be-
cause of the unimportance of the evidence involved. 62
The statement in Perez was offered to prove that defendant
R was a member of a conspiracy, for purposes of invoking the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. At that time, the
Ninth Circuit required "independent proof of the existence of
the conspiracy and of the connection of the declarant and the
defendant with it, ' '163 which meant that these facts had to be
proven with nonhearsay evidence.'6 One of the items of evi-
dence offered to show R's membership in the conspiracy was
the fact that R called P during the course of a drug transac-
tion. 65 P, who did not testify, told an agent that he had spoken
to R, and the agent so testified at trial. 66 Plenty of other evi-
dence showed that R was part of the conspiracy, so the court
may not have regarded analysis of this particular phone call as
critical.167
der victim when talking to friend over telephone, "Hector, don't do that now,"
not hearsay because not assertive when used for purpose of showing that Hec-
tor, the defendant, was in the victim's apartment at the time) aff'd, 156 Ariz.
125, 750 P.2d 883 (1988); Long v. Asphalt Paving Co., 47 N.C. App. 564, 569-70,
268 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1980) (finding statements such as "that is where you can get
the asphalt" and "Mr. Long is in the paving business" not offered for truth
when offered merely to show that trip on which statements were made was a
business trip); In re the Dependency of Penelope B., 104 Wash. 2d 643, 655, 709
P.2d 1185, 1192 (1985) (en banc) (concluding that child's statements and ac-
tions, such as statement that she was afraid father was in jail when she did not
see him, were not hearsay when offered as implied assertions to show father
abused child).
158. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
159. Id at 659.
160. Id. at 659 n.4.
161. Id. at 659 n.3 (quoting Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 591,
594 n.15).
162. The statement was unimportant because abundant evidence, including
R's own statements to the agent, indicated R's guilt. Id. at 659.
163. Id
164. Id. at 658.
165. Id. at 659.
166. Id
167. The court noted that there was "abundant evidence" establishing the
conspiracy. Id In any event, the court's opinion does not set forth the exact
nature of the communication during which P indicated that R had been on the
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2. Implicit Cases
Many other courts, without expressly demonstrating famil-
iarity with the scholarly literature on implied assertions, have
approved classification of statements involving hearsay dangers
as nonhearsay.168 These courts have used the language of the
assertion definition to justify the classification, either by char-
acterizing the utterances as "nonassertive" or by saying that
they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.16 9
Before describing these cases, I wish to make clear that by
pointing out that a statement involves hearsay dangers, I am
not saying the court should have excluded the evidence. Few
appellate opinions on the definition of hearsay readily appear to
reach unjust results. Appellate judges rarely admit patently
unreliable evidence by definitional manipulation, or if they do,
they do not describe the underlying facts in their opinions in a
way that makes the injustice manifest. This Part of the Article
is an attempt to determine from the caselaw what the opera-
tional definition of hearsay is, not a condemnation of the result
in any particular case.
a. Statements offered to show an assertion's falsity
Courts have applied the assertion definition to admit evi-
dence that relies on the declarant's credibility when the evi-
dence was offered not to show that a statement was true, but to
show that it was false, on the way to some further inference
that depends on the declarant's credibility. 7 0 I am not refer-
ring to cases in which a false utterance is offered as legally op-
erative language to establish slander or perjury; those cases
other end of the telephone. It deals with the problem in the following sen-
tence without further explanation: "Perez' verbal conduct acknowledging that
the caller was Ruvalcaba, whether express or implied, was an implied asser-
tion and admissible as nonassertive conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(a),(c). Id. at 659. The quoted sentence makes no sense. It could be a testa-
ment to the mesmerizing power of the word "nonassertive," but more likely it
is an example of a busy and unmesmerized court finding a pigeonhole into
which some relatively trivial evidence can be placed.
168. See infra notes 173-220 and accompanying text.
169. One could say that there are two opposing lines of cases, one accepting
implied assertions and one rejecting them, but that might suggest more order
than actually exists. The opposing cases do not acknowledge each other. In
fact, most of the cases that let in evidence raising dangers of reliance on de-
clarant credibility do not show awareness of that reliance. Even if the declar-
ant definition of hearsay were adopted, therefore, these courts might reach the
same result they now reach under the assertion definition.
170. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
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involve no reliance on credibility and no difference between the
two definitions. The cases in which the two definitions could
lead to different results are those in which the falsehood is of-
fered for an inference about the declarant's state of mind. Typ-
ically, the falsehood is offered for an inference that the
declarant was conscious of the joint guilt of the declarant and
another person.171 The value of the inference depends on the
declarant's narration, perception, and memory. For example,
the declarant might have a false conception of the other's guilt
because of a misunderstanding about something the other told
the declarant.172
The Supreme Court used the truth-of-the-matter-asserted
definition to admit a statement of this nature in Anderson v.
United States,73 in which evidence of cover-up statements was
received against an accomplice to show consciousness of joint
guilt.174 The precedential value of Anderson is somewhat di-
minished, however, by the obscure way the Court stated the
facts and by the Court's apparent belief that it was using the
statement in a way that involved no reliance on credibility and
hence no need for cross-examination. 75
171. IM
172. Of course, the evidence must be offered against someone other than
the declarant for the issue of hearsay classification to have impact; otherwise,
the admissions rule would provide a simple avenue for receiving the evidence.
173. 417 U.S. 211 (1974).
174. Id. at 219-20.
175. Anderson involved a dispute about the admissibility of prior testimony
that codefendants had given in an election fraud contest. Id at 214-17. The
prosecution offered this testimony on the theory that it was false, and that the
jury could draw an inference of guilty knowledge from the fact that the code-
fendants had given false testimony. Id at 220.
The defendants in Anderson allegedly caused fraudulent votes to be cast
both for federal and state candidates. Id at 214. They argued that the applica-
ble statute, 18 U.S.C § 241 (1968), applied only to punish federal vote fraud,
and that the federal conspiracy ended when the federal election was certified,
so that statements made by co-conspirators afterwards were not admissible.
Anderson, 417 U.S. at 217-18. The prosecution maintained that the purpose of
the conspiracy was to secure the election of a local official, but that it was nec-
essary to cast false federal votes on the same ballot because otherwise the
number of votes received by the local official would be suspicious. Id, at 222.
The fact that the codefendants gave demonstrably false testimony during the
inquiry into the state contest reflected on what happened in the federal con-
test.
The Supreme Court avoided the question whether § 241 applied to purely
state contests by holding that the evidence of false testimony during the in-
quiry into the state contest was admissible even if the federal statute under
which the defendants were charged covered only federal contests, since the ev-
idence was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id, at 219-20.
The Court assumed for purposes of argument that the conspiracy had ended
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United States v. Hackett 176 presents a more straightfor-
ward example of the use of falsehoods to show consciousness of
guilt. A codefendant, while standing on defendant's lawn,
made demonstrably false statements that he did not know who
lived in the defendant's house and that he had come from the
yacht club, not the house.177 The prosecution offered these
statements, along with the evidence proving they were false, to
show that the codefendant thought linkage with the defendant
would be incriminating. 78 The court held the statements ad-
missible against both defendants, because they "were admitted
not for their truth, but merely for the fact that the statements
were made."'179 Several other cases involving demonstrably
false statements by codefendants have arisen since the Federal
Rules were enacted, and have been resolved the same way. 80
by the time the testimony was given, and it specifically noted that it was not
relying on the co-conspirators's exception. Id- at 218-22. Nor was the perjured
testimony admitted as legally operative language that did not depend for value
on credibility; it was not used to prove the crime of perjury, but to show a
cover-up for purposes of proving the commission of the pre-perjury federal
election fraud. I&L at 220. Thus, this case appears to be one in which evidence
was defined as not hearsay under the assertion definition even though the evi-
dence required reliance on the credibility (memory, perception, and narration)
of the declarants. The facts are complicated, however, and it is not clear that
the Court itself considered that it was using evidence that involved dangers of
reliance on credibility. In fact, at one point it stated that the rationale of the
hearsay rule did not require exclusion; the government was not offering the
statements to prove the truth of anything asserted in them, and therefore "the
other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their
credibility in issue." Id This passage suggests that the Court did not believe
that any hearsay dangers were involved, and did not conceive of the case as
one in which the use of the evidence involved reliance on credibility.
176. 638 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
177. Id at 1186.
178. Id at 1186-87.
179. Id at 1186.
180. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1989) (defendant and a
companion were found at scene of attempted robbery; companion gave false
address; use of false address, to show guilty knowledge of companion; held not
hearsay and admissible to show defendant and companion not innocent by-
standers); United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that statement by codefendant to police claiming that he and codefendant
were in an alley "to meet two girls named 'Maria' and 'Christina"' not hear-
say when offered as false exculpatory statement intended to conceal arsonous
purpose for being in alley); United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 339-40 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding co-conspirators' false explanations to agent of movements
earlier in day and falsehoods about ownership of suitcase not hearsay when of-
fered to show conspiracy); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1353-54
(7th Cir.) (defense theory in prosecution for bribing public officials was that
defendant's brother's conduct in negotiating letter of credit in Liechtenstein
was innocent; evidence about brother's false testimony before grand jury,
claiming he did not visit Liechtenstein on trip to Europe, held admissible be-
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b. Statements offered to show linkage or association
Another class of cases involves a verbal utterance offered
to show contact or association between two people, or between
a person and a thing. 81 The typical example occurs when the
police, while searching a person in custody, find the name and
telephone number of another person. The evidence is offered
to show that the two are acquainted. 8 2 Applying the assertion
definition, the court is likely to say either that the name and
number were not offered to prove what they were asserting
(that a certain person had a certain number) or that they were
not offered assertively at all, but rather as circumstantial evi-
dence of association. 8 3
cause not offered to show truth of matter asserted), cert denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979); United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129, 135-36 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding
codefendant's false "death in the family" explanation for leaving hotel, accom-
panied by request to hold luggage, not hearsay and admissible against all de-
fendants; prosecution offered evidence on theory that defendants left suddenly
because they had robbed a bank, not because of death in family); United States
v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764-65 (8th Cir.) (holding codefendant's demonstrably
false statement to police officer that she had used a car to go buy bacon and
eggs admissible against all defendants to show consciousness that the car had
just been used for criminal purpose), cert denied, 433 U.S. 912 (1977); United
States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1970) (admitting as non-hearsay
co-defendant's lie to police about whose phone number was on paper found on
co-defendant, saying that it was the number of player on basketball team
coached by co-defendant and not defendant's number).
For an interesting case in which truth-telling was deemed nonhearsay
when used to show lack of guilty knowledge, see United States v. Webster, 750
F.2d 307, 330-33) (5th Cir.1984) (defendant told agents that aircraft was on de-
fendant's property, and in fact it was; offered by defendant to show lack of
guilty knowledge concerning aircraft; hearsay dangers are manifest but court
deems statement nonhearsay because not offered for truth), cert denied, 471
U.S. 1106 (1985). But see Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussed supra notes 96-105), which comes close to reaching the opposite result.
It is not exactly the same type of case, however, because the out-of-court state-
ment involved was not a falsehood, but a solicitation of a falsehood. Id. at 429-
30. No policy seems to distinguish the two, but perhaps a court can declare
more easily that a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted when the statement is offered as a falsehood, rather than as a request
that another person say something false.
181. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 183.
182. See id.
183. See United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding
car title papers found in car admissible to show tie between person named in
papers and car, and were not hearsay because not offered to show truth of as-
sertion of ownership; repair papers containing name of another person admis-
sible to tie that other person to car for time and distance derived from papers;
likewise not hearsay because not offered to show truth); United States v.
Triplett, 855 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1988) (table entry for unpublished opinion)
(WESTLAW, ALLFEDS) (admitting check, money order, and receipt bearing
defendant's name found in trailer as evidence that defendant occupied trailer;
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In such cases, use of the utterances as evidence involves
court reasons that writings are nonhearsay because not offered to prove mat-
ters asserted - that defendant paid for the item for which the receipt was
given); United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding en-
velope addressed by landlord to defendant and another person admissible to
show defendant lived in apartment; court reasoned that envelope was not of-
fered for the "implied truth of its written contents" but for implications to be
drawn from the landlord's "behavior"), on rehearing, 710 F.2d 431, on remand,
575 F. Supp. 63 (1983); United States v. Saint Prix, 672 F.2d 1077, 1083 (2d Cir.)
(admitting sales slip bearing defendant's name to show connection between de-
fendant and van that was subject of sales slip; "the sales slips were not admit-
ted to prove that Hutchison bought the vans. They were admitted to prove
that someone using Hutchison's name bought the vans, from which the jury
could infer that the person using Hutchison's name was Hutchison himself.
Admission for this purpose is permissible so long as other evidence connected
Hutchison with the person using his name."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 992 (1982);
United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding letter ad-
dressed to four defendants arrested on boat carrying marijuana, saying, inter
alia, "On precious cargo my thoughts are with you," not hearsay when offered
to show linkage), cert denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982); United States v. Mejias, 552
F.2d 435, 446 (2d Cir.) (holding receipt from motel and similar documents not
offered to show that defendant paid his motel bill, and hence not offered for
truth of matter asserted, when offered merely to show a connection between
defendant and the motel), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977); United States v.
Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 267 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding names mentioned in tele-
phone conversation not hearsay when used to show association), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 969 (1979); United States v. Ruiz, 477 F.2d 918, 919 (2d Cir.) (holding
slip of paper bearing defendant's nickname seized from alleged co-conspirator
not hearsay because "not introduced to show the truth or falsity of its con-
tents" but merely to show that the bearer knew the defendant and expected to
call him on the telephone), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); United States v.
Ellis, 461 F.2d 962, 970 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding address book admissible as not
offered for truth when offered merely to show link with person named in
book), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866 (1972); Brown v. United States, 403 F.2d 489,
491 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding note with name and telephone number admissible
to show link); United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 404 (2d Cir.) (holding
address book not hearsay when used to show link between person named in
book and possessor of book), cert denied, 385 U.S. 959 (1966); United States v.
Mishkin, 317 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir. (holding evidence that person who picked
up obscene books from locker had defendant's telephone number and other in-
formation about defendant in pocket at time of arrest admissible as nonhear-
say evidence of link between defendant and courier; the court reasoned that
the evidence was offered to show the link, not to show what the defendant's
telephone number was), cert; denied, 375 U.S. 827 (1963); cf United States v.
Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 33-35 (1st Cir.) (finding lists containing names and tasks
for members of drug conspiracy not hearsay when offered to show member-
ship in conspiracy of those named; possession of list by co-conspirator deemed
nonassertive nonverbal conduct), cert denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United
States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.) (holding name labels on photo-
graphs not hearsay when offered to show who had been photographed (dicta)),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984 (1980). But see United States v. Watkins, 519 F.2d
294, 296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding rent receipts bearing defendant's name
hearsay and not admissible to show that defendant resided in apartment; re-
ceipts were offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein; court did not
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hearsay dangers. Take the case of the found slip of paper:
"John T. 929-0955." The paper is offered to show a link be-
tween the possessor and John T. The declarant who wrote the
name and number might have mistaken the name, and then
looked up a number under the wrong name. The writer even
may have had some reason rooted in deception, such as wanting
to appear to know someone who was respected or feared, for
writing down a number without knowing the person. Similarly,
a person who makes out a receipt may have misheard the
name, or may have been given the wrong name. Absent knowl-
edge that the information might be used in litigation, however,
the dangers are remote and one can understand the inclination
of many courts to admit the evidence.
Wigmore l s 4 and McCormick 8 5 would admit linkage evi-
dence by deeming it circumstantial evidence, analogous to fin-
gerprints or other "traces." The analogy is sound in some
situations. Showing that a person possessed a distinctive writ-
deal with possible argument that receipts were not offered to show defendant
paid the amount, hence not offered for truth); cf United States v. Garcia-Du-
arte, 718 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding murder victim's drug transaction
book not admissible to show drug transactions between victim and defendant).
For a linkage case in which hearsay dangers were either absent or infini-
tesimally diminished, see United States v. Canieso, 470 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Friendly, J.) Chou had traveled from Asia with a drug courier named
Canieso. Chou objected to the introduction of a letter found in the courier's
wallet. I&i at 1232. The letter gave instructions about what to do on arrival in
New York. I&. It said that the two men should take a taxi to the hotel, that
they should stay together, that "the man follow you he cannot speak English."
Id. These instructions dovetailed with instructions in Chinese found in Chou's
wallet. I&. The court approved admission on grounds that the letters linked
the two men circumstantially. Id-; see also United States v. Muscato, 534 F.
Supp. 969, 973-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Weinstein, J.) (involving witness's pretrial
statement showing knowledge of unique characteristic of pistol, offered to link
witness with pistol; opinion provides extensive and thoughtful discussions of
theory that evidence admissible as nonhearsay evidence of a "trace" in the wit-
ness's mind; court expresses doubt about theory but advances it as one possible
basis for receiving the evidence).
The assertion definition provides a door for admission of utterances to
show association when none of the standard exceptions applies. In the cases
cited above, the utterances were not statements of a party opponent offered
against that party, and the utterances were not made during the course of and
in furtherance of a conspiracy.
184. See 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, §§ 148-151a, at 1744-59 (stating that
"mechanical traces," including name tags, are admissible to show origin,
among other things); id. § 150a, at 1756 n.1 (criticizing People v. Hill, 198 N.Y.
64, 70, 91 N.E. 272, 274 (1910), for expressing doubt about the admissibility of
keys with tag bearing defendant's name found at place of murder).
185. See McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 249, at 592
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
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ing that can be traced by its physical characteristics to a given
source is like showing that the person possessed any other dis-
tinctive object. For example, when attempting to show a con-
nection between a defendant and a hotel, evidence that the
defendant possessed a receipt with the hotel's logo, or a
matchbox or towel with the hotel's name on it, poses no hear-
say dangers when the writing is authenticated as coming from
the hotel.' 86 Such evidence stands on the same basis, so far as
the hearsay rule is concerned, as evidence that the defendant's
shoes had carpet fibers from the hotel.
Many writings admitted as "circumstantial evidence," how-
ever, do involve hearsay dangers. A key chain labeled with
Hill's name is good evidence that Hill owns the keychain, 8 7 but
use of the label in evidence involves hearsay dangers, assuming
no witness can identify the label as having the same physical
appearance as one shown to belong to Hill. The label is, in ef-
fect, a statement that "this key chain belongs to Hill," and
cross-examination of the person who made the statement might
reveal defects of sincerity, perception, narration, or memory.
The allure of the phrase "circumstantial evidence," and the
authority of Wigmore'8 8 and McCormick, 8 9 sometimes have
caused even direct assertions, offered to prove the truth of
what they assert, to be admitted to show connection or linkage.
For example, in United States v. Snow, 19° the court admitted a
name label on a briefcase to show that the person named on the
label possessed a weapon found in the briefcase.' 91 The court
noted the quite reasonable argument that the label was an as-
sertion that the briefcase belonged to Snow, offered to prove
the truth of the assertion, but declared the evidence nonhear-
say on the authority of Wigmore.192
186. See Graham, supra note 15, at 913-14.
187. See 1A J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 150 n.3, at 1756 n.3 (criticizing
People v. Hill, 198 N.Y. 64, 70, 91 N.E. 272, 274 (1910): "[Tlhis case shows how
different a man a judge is when reasoning about his own affairs at home as
opposed to reasoning in the judicial straitjacket; suppose he had forbidden a
certain young man to court his daughter and then one morning found on the
parlor floor by the sofa a bunch of keys with the tabooed young man's name;
would he hold that 'there was some doubt whether the evidence was properly
admitted' "?).
188. 1A J.WGMORE, supra note 13, § 24, at 944-52.
189. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 249, at 594 (E.
Cleary 2d ed. 1975).
190. 517 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975).
191. I& at 443-45.
192. Id. at 443-44. Some evidence suggested that the defendant had been
seen with a briefcase bearing a name tape, but the witness who gave this evi-
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Like the other cases involving association, linkage, or activ-
ities on the premises, the evidence in Snow seems trustworthy
because it is unlikely the declarant would foresee the state-
ment's use in litigation, or would tailor a fabrication to mislead
the trier of fact.193
Similar issues have arisen when the prosecution seeks to
use a hotel registration card to trace a defendant to a hotel.
Suppose the prosecution wishes to prove that the defendant oc-
cupied a certain hotel room at a certain time, and it offers into
evidence a hotel registration card bearing the defendant's name
and purported signature. Here, some courts have been more
cautious than the Snow court.' 94 Perhaps they have envisioned
a real danger that someone registering at a hotel might give
someone else's name, or perhaps the presence of a signature in
evidence alerted them to a method through which the linkage
evidence could be corroborated. At any rate, at least two courts
have held that the evidence is not admissible to prove the de-
fendant was registered at the hotel, although it may be used to
show that someone using the defendant's name was regis-
tered. 95 That the person using the defendant's name was actu-
ally the defendant must be proven by other evidence, which
may include exemplars of defendant's handwriting so that the
jury can compare them with the hotel registration signature.196
dence also testified that the briefcase sought to be introduced at trial was not
the one she had seen in the defendant's possession. Id at 442. It is not clear
that the court attached any importance to this testimony. Had the witness af-
firmatively testified that she had seen the defendant with the briefcase with
the "Snow" tag, then the evidence would not be hearsay any more than any
other evidence of physical characteristics of the briefcase.
193. By contrast, in a case in which the use of a label in litigation was read-
ily foreseeable, the court had no trouble classifying it hearsay. In Payne v.
Janasz, 711 F.2d 1305, 1313-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1019 (1983), a tag
saying "10001 Cedar Avenue" had been affixed not by an unknown declarant,
but by someone in the police evidence room. The court held that testimony
about the tag was hearsay. I&
In an interesting case that did not seem to involve the danger that the la-
bel was prepared for litigation, but that did involve the affixing of a label with
a conscious purpose to show source, the court found a postmark to be hearsay
when offered to show the source of a letter. See United States v. Cowley, 720
F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding postmark hearsay when offered to
show origin of letter; would be admissible under residual exception but for
lack of notice).
194. United States v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272, 276 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1013 (1988); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 99-101 (2d Cir.
1980).
195. Bell, 833 F.2d at 276; Lieberman, 637 F.2d at 99-101.
196. Bell, 833 F.2d at 276; Lieberman, 637 F.2d at 99-101. Both courts sug-
gested an alternative route of admission: laying a foundation for admission
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Even this use of the evidence involves some hearsay dangers.
The clerk might have heard the wrong name, or the registrant
might have made a mistake in filling out the card. The dangers
seem trifling, however, compared to those encountered with ev-
idence routinely admitted under hearsay exceptions. 197
United States v. Day 198 probably also belongs in the cate-
gory of "association" cases, although it has some unusual fea-
tures that set it off from run-of-the-mill association cases. Day
involved statements made by a murder victim, Williams,
shortly before the killing.199 Williams described a fight with
"Beanny" (Day) and indicated that he was afraid of being
harmed.200 Williams gave a friend Beanny's name and tele-
phone number with instructions to call the police, give them
the number, and tell them the story if Williams did not return
the next day.201 On appeal, Judge MacKinnon held that
although the statements accompanying the delivery of the slip
of paper were inadmissible, the paper itself was not hearsay be-
cause "It]he words themselves do not assert anything except
that Beanny and/or Eric might have a particular telephone
number."20 2 In addition, Judge MacKinnon allowed the witness
to testify "that sometime in the hour before the shooting Wil-
liams gave him the slip of paper, that he telephoned the police
after witnessing the shooting, and that he gave the police the
information on the slip. °2 0 3
This result seems wrong even under the assertion defini-
tion, because the jury could infer from the evidence described
under the business records exception by showing that the hotel verified the
identify of the person registering. The court did not explain exactly how the
business records exception would be satisfied. Even if the person registering
showed the hotel clerk a driver's license, the record still would include hear-
ay furnished by a person not under a business duty. Perhaps the driver's li-
cense or other verification, however, sufficiently justies a finding by the judge,
under FED. R. EVID. 104(a), that the registrant's statement was an admission of
a party (assuming that the hotel record was offered against the person named
in it). The verification would, of course, make the evidence more reliable as a
commonsense matter, which seems to have been the primary focus of these
courts, rather than the technical requirements of the business records excep-
tion or the hearsay definition.
197. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 38-47 (1942) (discussing the dubious ratio-
nales supporting many categories of statements routinely admitted under
hearsay exceptions).
198. 591 F.2d 861, 881-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (MacKinnon, J.).
199. Id, at 879-87.
200. Id. at 879.
201. Id. at 879-80.
202. 1d at 883.
203. Id
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that the victim also must have said that Day was after him.20 4
One does not solve the hearsay problem under either definition
by expunging the statement itself, leaving clues of its existence,
and inviting the trier to guess what it was. Day is not a case in
which the proponent can argue that a declarant's indirect state-
ment was being offered inferentially. It is a case in which a di-
rect assertion has been slipped in the back door by expunging
the actual assertion but admitting evidence that will lead the
jury to infer the existence of a direct assertion.205
c. Statements offered to show knowledge of a fact proven by
other evidence
The "association" cases, in which evidence is offered to
show linkage between two people or a person and a thing, re-
semble another class of cases involving implied assertions of-
fered merely to show the declarant's knowledge of a fact, when
the fact itself is proven in some other fashion.2°6 For example,
a declarant's assertion that his brakes were bad could be
deemed nonhearsay, under the assertion definition, when of-
fered to show that if the brakes were bad the declarant knew of
it. 20 7 Similarly, statements by children about sexual matters
could be considered nonhearsay when offered merely to show-
knowledge of sexual facts. 208 Such statements involve hearsay
dangers, but sometimes the dangers are minimal. It is just
204. Cf. United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1979), cert de-
nied, 484 U.S. 895 (1981). The trial court in Ariza-Tbarra was reversed for al-
lowing the government to introduce into evidence testimony about a drug
informant's reliability during the guilt or innocence phase of a criminal trial.
I& at 222-23. The evidence was relevant only if one assumed the informant
had implicated the defendant. The jury therefore was invited to infer that the
informant-declarant had made a direct assertion of the defendant's guilt. Thus
this is a case of what I have elsewhere called an expunged assertion, not a case
involving an implied assertion. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
The trial witness did not testify to the declarant's assertion in so many words,
but did give testimony that invited the jury to infer that the declarant had as-
serted that the defendant was a drug dealer. Ariza-lbarra, 605 F.2d at 1222-23.
This type of testimony should be regarded as hearsay regardless of the defini-
tion chosen or the treatment given to implied assertions. Graham, supra note
15, at 911 & n.51; see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
The evidence in Day was not needed to show association between the de-
fendant and the victim; there was ample other evidence of that undisputed
fact. See 591 F.2d at 894 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
205. For a discussion of other expunged assertion cases, see supra notes 60-
65 and accompanying text.
206. MCCOm MICK ON EViDENCE § 250, at 741-42 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
207. Id- § 249, at 591 & n.98.
208. See, e.g., In re Dependency of Penelope B., 104 Wash. 2d 643, 654, 709
P.2d 1185, 1190-92 (1985) (en banc).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
barely possible that the declarant who states that the brakes
are bad is merely trying to scare a passenger, without actually
knowing the brakes are bad.
Occasionally the dangers are more substantial, as was the
case in United States v. Parry.20 9 The defendant in Parry was
charged with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.210
Undercover agents testified that he had acted as an intermedi-
ary in three drug transactions.211 He did not deny participating
in the transactions, but claimed he participated in the good
faith belief that he was cooperating with the agents in helping
them locate local drug dealers.21 He testified that he had
known one of the agents was an agent before participating in
any of the transactions, and offered into evidence his mother's
testimony about statements he had made to her.21 3 She testi-
fied that he had told her the person who frequently called the
mother's home asking for him was a narcotics agent with whom
he had been working, and that she, the mother, was "not to
worry." 214
The district court excluded the evidence, but the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the evidence was not hearsay.215
The court reasoned that the evidence was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted because "this statement was not of-
fered to prove that the caller was a narcotics agent or that
Parry was working with the agent, but to establish that Parry
had knowledge of the agent's identity when he spoke." 216
Although the court asserted that the statement's value did not
rest on the declarant's credibility,217 it seems not at all far-
fetched to suppose that Parry might have lied to his mother by
saying that his caller, who may have acted like a drug dealer,
was in fact a narcotics agent. The evidence therefore posed
hearsay dangers.
209. 649 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
210. Id at 294.
211. Id,
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id
215. Id-
216. Id- at 295 (alternative holding). The court also noted that the state-
ment could have been admitted as a prior consistent statement under Rule
801(d)(1)(B), an argument that was apparently not presented to the trial
judge. Id.
217. Id.
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d. Statements offered to show illegal activity at a given
location
Another line of cases classifying utterances as nonhearsay
even though they threaten some hearsay dangers involves
statements offered as indirect evidence that illegal activities are
taking place at a given location. Cases like United States v.
Zenni 2 1 that allow introduction of intercepted telephone calls
to the premises are one example.21 9 Other cases involve
records or documents found on the premises. Some cases have
allowed records of drug sales or of gambling transactions, found
on sites of suspected illegal activity, to be received as nonhear-
say on grounds that they are not offered to show the truth of
any specific statement contained in them, but rather to show in
general that illegal activity was taking place on the premises.220
I have described the principal types of "implied assertion"
cases, although some defy classification. 221 I hope that I have
218. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980); see supra notes 143-51 and accompa-
nying text.
219. IHi at 469; see also supra note 151 (discussing other cases classifying ut-
terances as nonhearsay even though they present some hearsay dangers).
220. See United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir.) (holding docu-
ments containing records of bets admissible only to show the scope of gam-
bling operations and "not for the truth of the specific statements contained in
the various documents"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); United States v. Wil-
son, 532 F.2d 641, 643-47 (8th Cir.) (finding records of drugs sales found in
apartment admissible because "not offered to prove the truth of the facts as-
serted therein"; rather, they were "utterances, used circumstantially, giving
rise to the indirect inference that the apartment was the scene of drug sales
and drug related activity"(emphasis in original)), cert denied, 429 U.S. 846
(1976). But cf. United States v. Garcia, 718 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding it
was reversible error to receive the "customer book" of cocaine dealer into evi-
dence against alleged customer based on co-conspirator exception to hearsay).
221. For example, one is not likely to encounter another case like United
States v. Detrich, 865 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1988). In Detrich, the defendant claimed
he had been duped into bringing a man's suit with heroin in the shoulder pads
through customs. Id at 18. The defendant told police that an acquaintance in
India asked him to bring it the suit to the United States and deliver it to some-
one about to be married (the suit was to be a wedding suit). Id. at 19. The
court held admissible testimony that the person who met defendant at the air-
port told police, after arrest, that he was soon getting married, when offered in
favor of the defendant. Id. at 20-21. In another 1988 case, United States v. Ben-
ton, 852 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 555 (1988), the court al-
lowed a law enforcement official on trial on drug conspiracy charges to
introduce into evidence, over a codefendant's objection, the official's purported
"confidential file" on the drug activities to support the official's defense that
the official was investigating, not participating in conspiracy; the file was not
offered to prove the truth of any statements contained therein. Id. at 1468.
(The codefendant objected because the file named him as a target of a drug
investigation.) Quite possibly the declarant simply fabricated the statements
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given a fair idea of the types of situations in which modern fed-
eral courts treat evidence involving hearsay dangers as
nonhearsay.
3. What does the caselaw show about judicial acceptance of
implied assertions?
The caselaw discussed above shows first that the Supreme
Court has not written about the implied assertion problem.222
Two of its decisions are suggestive because they pass up oppor-
tunities to use the implied assertion theory to admit evi-
dence.223 One cannot say, however, that these cases show
conscious Supreme Court support for the declarant definition
of hearsay, because no evidence suggests the Court has given
any thought to the issue. The two decisions merely suggest that
the opportunity to seize upon a distinction based on minor dif-
ferences in the wording of an assertion was not attractive to the
Justices sitting when those decisions were issued, or at least not
so tantalizing as to cause the lawyers to argue it or the Court to
employ it spontaneously. The two decisions provide ammuni-
tion for those favoring the declarant definition, but the ammu-
nition was never very explosive, and time has dampened it
because both decisions predate the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 224
Scattered lower court cases do specifically consider the im-
plied assertion issue. Since enactment of the Federal Rules in
1975, a handful of courts have expressly adopted or rejected the
position that implied assertions are hearsay.225 Many other fed-
in the file, but I find it hard not to agree with the court of appeals that the
evidence should have been admitted, especially because the defendant testified
and was subject to cross-examination. A possible alternative ground for admis-
sion would be as a prior consistent statement, because the defendant likely
was charged with fabricating his defense. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
222. See supra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
223. See notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
224. Another decision of the Supreme Court, United States v. Anderson,
417 U.S. 211 (1974), suggests that the Court would be receptive to the view that
assertions offered as falsehoods, for purposes of showing consciousness of
guilt, are not hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. IM at 219-20. This decision departs from a strict declarant def-
inition, because the assertions do depend for value upon credibility. Again,
however, it does not appear that the Court thought about the difference be-
tween the assertion and the declarant definitions when reaching this result.
See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
225. Cases adopting the position that implied assertions are hearsay in-
clude: Lyle, 720 F.2d at 433; Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 103; Park, 493 F.2d at 357;
Paceili, 491 F.2d at 1111-12, 1115-17. Cases in which implied assertions have
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eral decisions reflect a possible difference between the two defi-
nitions. These decisions classify verbal conduct as nonhearsay
on the ground that it is not assertive, or not offered to prove
the truth of an assertion, despite the existence of hearsay dan-
gers.226 These opinions do not discuss the implied assertion
controversy expressly or speak of hearsay dangers. Under a
strict interpretation of the declarant definition, however, the
utterances involved in these cases would be classified as hear-
say.227 It therefore is fair to say that a declarant definition, if
rigorously followed, often would lead to a different hearsay
classification than the assertion definition. That conclusion
does not mean results would differ at the admissibility level. It
simply means that evidence now classified as nonhearsay would
be classified as hearsay, and would need the help of an excep-
tion to find its way into evidence.
Although many cases classify as nonhearsay statements in-
volving hearsay dangers, these cases generally have arisen in
situations in which the dangers are minimal. Many of them
have involved intercepted declarations.228 The declarants could
not have foreseen the purpose for which the statements ulti-
mately were used at trial, unless one assumes bizarre facts. 229
Sincerity dangers therefore are reduced.
Moreover, courts generally have avoided making results
turn on niceties in the way the declarant phrased an utterance.
Judge Wisdom's fear that if the rule about implied assertions
were otherwise, "the hearsay rule could easily be circumvented
through clever questioning and coaching of witnesses, so that
answers were framed as implied rather than as direct asser-
tions, ' 230 seems not to have been realized. The decisions in
which courts have classified utterances as nonhearsay despite
the existence of hearsay dangers rarely have involved any real
danger that an utterance originally in direct form was recast,
been held not hearsay include: Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 357; Zenni, F. Supp. at 466
n.7, 468.
226. See supra notes 168-220 and accompanying text.
227. I am referring to the cases involving, for example, utterances offered
as falsehoods to show consciousness of guilt, utterances used to show associa-
tion, and utterances used to show illegal activities on the premises. See supra
notes 170-80 and accompanying text (cases involving utterances offered as
falsehoods); supra notes 182-205 and accompanying text (cases involving utter-
ances used to show assertions); supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text
(cases involving utterances used to show illegal activities on the premises).
228. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
229. E.g., a caller to a bookie knows police are there monitoring telephone
calls and still proceeds to place bets.
230. Park, 493 F.2d at 928.
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for trial purposes, as an indirect utterance.23 1 Indeed, the utter-
ances classed as nonhearsay despite hearsay dangers seem to
be made in situations in which it would have been strange or
unnatural to assert directly the matter sought to be proven.232
Consider the character-of-establishment and association cases.
People do not call their bookies and say "Hello, you are a book-
maker;" nor do they carry around slips of paper saying "I am
associated with Arnold Jones." When the danger Judge Wis-
dom described has existed, courts either have adopted a declar-
ant approach 233 or have passed over the possibility of using an
implied assertion theory.2 s4
Perhaps utterances offered as falsehoods2 35 are an excep-
tion to this generalization. In that situation, one easily can im-
agine a direct assertion of the fact to be proven. For example,
after arrest, one co-conspirator might make a statement di-
rectly incriminating another co-conspirator. Offsetting consid-
erations, however, may make it easier to accept routine
admission of such evidence. It is unlikely that the declarant
was engaged in some intricate lie that involved incriminating
another by making a statement that would have an incriminat-
ing effect only if believed to be false.
In short, the decisions classifying implied assertions as
nonhearsay generally arise from factual situations in which the
circumstances reduce dangers of fabrication by either the de-
231. See, e.g., United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409, 412-13 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding officer's testimony that barmaid had identified defendant and
his companions as persons passing counterfeit bills admissible as highly proba-
tive and reliable); State v. Tolisana, 136 Conn. 210, 214-16. 70 A.2d 118, 119-20
(1949) (admitting as nonhearsay telephone conversation of alleged bettors
based on finding of intention to place bets and finding that alleged bettors had
reason to know they were dealing with bookie, despite hearsay dangers of
credibility); Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Fact of Making or Re-
ceiving Telephone Calls, 13 A.L.R.2d 1409, 1411-26.
232. See supra note 231.
233. See supra notes 86-128 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text. But see United States
v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 888 (5th Cir.) (holding post-arrest statements by occu-
pants of drug-carrying boat, that "We made a mistake by throwing the papers
overboard and not laying offshore until a pickup" and "It was to be an $80,000
- one-time shot for $80,000," admissible against all occupants of boat, whether
or not present at the time, because the statements were not offered for the
truth of what they asserted), cert denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Brunswick Corp.
v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987) (regarding product con-
fusion survey; court distinguishes between saying a reel is a Zebco (not hear-
say when offered to show confusion of another reel with a Zebco) and saying
the reel looks like a Zebco (hearsay); distinction has no functional significance
in case because court holds entire survey admissible).
235. See supra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74:783
IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY
clarant or the trial witness. Although it may be worthwhile
pedagogically to discuss whether the assertion definition could
lead to ridiculous results based on minor differences in phras-
ing that have no conceivable effect on reliability, the published
cases do not indicate that courts are reaching these results.
I will turn now to the question whether, in light of the
body of caselaw just examined, codifiers should revise the fed-
eral definition of hearsay so that implied assertions are ex-
cluded from the definition.
III. SHOULD THE FEDERAL RULES BE CHANGED TO
DEFINE IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY?
The caselaw suggests that the definition of hearsay in Rule
801(c) sometimes has led courts to classify utterances as
nonhearsay despite the presence of hearsay dangers. 236 One
could attempt to avoid this result by changing a few words in
the rule. This change could be made without altering the fed-
eral rulemakers' widely accepted and wise decision to exclude
nonverbal nonassertive conduct from the definition of hear-
say.237 One way of making the change would be to amend Rule
801(c) to provide that all verbal expressions whose probative
value depends on the declarant' credibility are hearsay. An-
other way would be to amend Rule 801(c) to define as hearsay
any verbal expression offered as evidence of the declarant's be-
lief in a matter, to prove the matter believed.238 Either form of
236. See supra notes 142-70 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 46-49, 17-19 and accompanying text.
238. Professor Wellborn's proposed revision, from which the language in
the text is derived, would change Rules 801(a)-(c) as follows:
(a) STATEMENT. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written verbal ex-
pression or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him
as a communication.
(b) DECLARANT. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) HEARSAY. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered as evidence
of declarant's belief in a matter, to prove the matter believed.
Wellborn, supra note 7, at 92.
Texas subsequently has adopted a rule similar to the one proposed by Pro-
fessor Wellborn, who served as Reporter of the State Bar of Texas Liaison
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Texas rule is meant to
have the same effect as the Wellborn proposal, but to retain the familiar
phrase "truth of the matter asserted." It does so by separately defining "mat-
ter asserted" so that it "includes any matter explicitly asserted, and any mat-
ter implied by a statement, if the probative value of the statement as offered
flows from declarant's belief in the matter." See TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 801(c)
and Tsx. R. Civ. EVID. 801(c).
Professor Michael Graham has offered a similar proposal. Although Pro-
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
revision would codify the doctrine of Wright v. Tatham as it ap-
plies to verbal conduct.239 The first approach perhaps would
make the nature of the change more obvious on the face of the
codification, because of the degree of departure from traditional
language. The second, however, would emphasize that the pur-
pose for which the evidence is being offered is crucial to the
hearsay determination.
The case for changing Rule 801(c) is based principally on
two arguments. The first is that the assertion definition of the
Federal Rules is vague and confusing.240 The second is that the
distinction between direct assertions and implied assertions is
arbitrary. Proponents of revision have argued that, at least in
regard to verbal conduct,241 hearsay dangers are as great in the
case of implied assertions as in the case of direct assertions.m
The arguments for change have been made with logic,
force, and clarity. The arguments in favor of the status quo are
more diffuse and less easily stated, but are more persuasive.
The Rules have been in place for almost fifteen years; courts
have used the truth-of-the-matter-asserted definition for a far
longer period. Change would eliminate a formula familiar to
fessor Graham believes that existing Rule 801(c) should be interpreted to
reach the same result as Wright v. Tatham, he has suggested that clarity
would be fostered by revising the definition of hearsay to read as follows:
(c) Hearsay: "Hearsay" is a statement offered in evidence, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing, to the extent relevance depends upon (1) the truth of the matter
asserted or (2) the declarant's belief in the truth or falsity of the mat-
ter asserted.
Graham, supra note 15, at 921. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVmENCE § 801.10
(1981).
239. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
240. See Graham, supra note 15, at 909 (deploring "analytical confusion"
that arises from use of concept of assertions used to infer something other
than the truth of the matter directly asserted); Wellborn, supra note 7, at 68
(stating that Rule 801 is "fraught with ambiguity and complexity"); i& at 92
(finding that "[o]ne of the worst features of the rule is its susceptibility to vari-
ous interpretations").
241. Wellborn and Graham view verbal and nonverbal conduct as present-
ing different problems. Graham favors treating nonassertive nonverbal con-
duct as nonhearsay on policy grounds. See Graham, supra note 15, at 909.
Wellborn at least cedes sufficient merit to this position to propose hearsay
classification only for "statements." He would define a "statement" as "an
oral or written verbal expression" or "nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by him as a communication." Wellborn, supra note 7, at 92.
242. See Graham, supra note 15, at 909 (finding that, although the Advisory
Committee was correct in finding less of a credibility risk associated with non-
verbal conduct that is not intended as an assertion, the Committee failed to
fully grasp the consequences of extending this concept to cases that involve
verbal statements offered as implied assertions).
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lawyers and judges that provides good guidance in most situa-
tions. Moreover, no revision of Rule 801(c) would achieve uni-
versal acceptance. The amendment would be adopted in some
states, rejected in others, and perhaps adopted in compromise
form in others. Revision of Rule 801(c) therefore would under-
mine uniformity. In view of these problems, the proponents of
change ought to bear the burden of showing that the present
rule has caused injustice or inconvenience.
One criticism of Rule 801(c)'s definition is its obscurity and
indeterminacy. Probably everyone familiar with the puzzles
arising from the hearsay rule feels the force of this criticism,
but that does not make the criticism easy to evaluate. The Rule
801(c) definition does work quite well in some contexts. For
example, Rule 801(c) makes it easy to identify as nonhearsay
utterances offered to show their effect on the hearer or
reader.243 For this large category of nonhearsay utterances, the
truth-of-the-matter-asserted formula focuses attention on the
purpose for which the utterance is offered, and provides gui-
dance that is quicker and easier to follow than declarant
definitions.
For another category of nonhearsay utterances, those of-
fered as legally operative language, the Rule 801(c) definition
occasionally causes confusion. It is not clear, however, that
adopting the declarant definition would lessen the confusion.
The assertion definition causes confusion because of congruence
between the utterance and the matter sought to be proven. For
example, the utterance "this is a gift" seems to many hearsay
novices to be offered to prove the truth of what it asserts when
offered to show the giving of a gift. Under the assertion defini-
tion, the nonhearsay classification of such utterances can be
justified on the ground that they are nonassertive; they are
performative utterances that cannot be true or false, only effec-
tive or ineffective. Although they sometimes depend for their
legal effect on the declarant's state of mind, that does not affect
the assertiveness or truth or falsity of the utterance. Instead, it
relates to the effectiveness of the utterance, just as the question
whether the utterance was made contemporaneously with a
property transfer might relate to effectiveness.244 Under a de-
clarant definition, one is tempted to explain the nonhearsay
status of legally operative language on the ground that it does
not depend for value on memory, perception, sincerity, or nar-
243. MCCOMUICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 733-34 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
244. Cf. J.L. AusTIN, How TO DO THINGS wrrH WoRDs 12-24 (2d ed. 1962).
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ration. Utterances such as "this is a gift," however, do depend
for value on sincerity and narrative ability when subjective in-
tent governs the legal effect of the utterance. If we assume
that utterances such as "this is a gift" should continue to be
classified as nonhearsay even if they depend for effectiveness
on a belief of the declarant, then the declarant definition does
not provide the user better guidance than the assertion
definition.4 5
The assertion definition also has been criticized on the
ground that it might require the judge to make a difficult deter-
mination about the actual intent of the declarant.246 That need
not be the case, however, because the interpretation of the as-
sertion definition advanced in Part I of this Article would re-
move the need for any determination of actual intent.27
Across the universe of nonhearsay utterances, the effect of
switching to a declarant definition is hard to assess. It is easy to
point out that an existing definition often operates in fog, but it
is difficult to predict that another one would bring sunlight.
The fog may be generated by the complexity of the hearsay
problem, and by uncertainty about the evils the rule is designed
245. The version of the declarant definition set forth in R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 18, avoids this problem. Lempert & Saltzburg create a
testimonial triangle that would treat as nonhearsay utterances that require
only an inference from the making of the statement to the belief of the declar.
ant, without a further inference that the belief reflects external reality, that
is, when the inference depends only on suppositions about sincerity and lack of
ambiguity, and not on suppositions about memory and perception. See id. at
358-39 (illustrating the hearsay dangers with a triangle whose left leg repre-
sents dangers of insincerity and ambiguity, and whose right leg represents
dangers of faulty memory and misperception, and concluding that "it makes
sense to classify statements used so as to eliminate right leg dangers entirely
as not hearsay.;) see also id. at 360 (recognizing that the statement "this is a
loan," when offered to show a loan, is "relevant because it negates donative
intent" and that "Itihis inference about donative intent seems to require the
jury to reason from the making of the statement to the donor's belief about
the transaction," but indicating that under their definition of hearsay the ut-
terance would not be hearsay; there is no (right-legged) reliance on memory
and perception; see also id at 363 (arguing that both direct and indirect state-
ments of state of mind should be considered not hearsay). A codification based
on this definition would avoid the misguidance problem described in the text.
The other problems of adopting a declarant definition remain, however, and
one of the reasons for changing definitions, to create an analytically pure defi-
nition that only treats evidence as nonhearsay when hearsay dangers are ab-
sent, would not be applicable.
246. See, e.g., Wellborn, supra note 7, at 79 (criticizing a subjective intent
test). Professor Wellborn also describes an objective intent test, which he con-
siders unambiguous but arbitrary. Id. at 80-81.
247. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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to combat, rather than by the definition. The revisions dis-
cussed in this Article would retain the distinction between ac-
tion and communication,m8 and as long as that distinction is
maintained an obscure twilight zone will exist. Maintaining the
distinction probably will mean that the term "verbal act" will
continue to live a life in the caselaw, luring some judges to dis-
pose of assertive verbal conduct as if it were nonassertive non-
verbal conduct.
Courts and commentators sometimes use the term "verbal
act" unobjectionably to label legally operative language.2 9
Some hearsay writers, however, have defined it more broadly.
For example, Wigmore's generous concept of "verbal act"250
leaves open the possibility of labeling verbal conduct a "verbal
act" even when the conduct involves hearsay dangers and is not
legally operative.251 Courts sometimes have used "verbal act"
248. Nonassertive nonverbal conduct still would be excluded from the
hearsay definition, even if offered to show a belief of the actor, under the two
definitions discussed supra notes 237-39. Any definition that attempted to go
further, and reinstate Mright v. Tatham insofar as it applies to nonverbal con-
duct, would run into problems of its own, not the least of which is that the
hearsay nature of nonverbal conduct generally would be ignored. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
249. See NLRB v. M. Koch & Sons, 578 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1978);
Creaghe v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 323 F.2d 981, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1963); Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249, at 732-33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
250. Wigmore describes four "simple limitations" that can be used to deter-
mine whether an utterance is not hearsay because it forms a "verbal act":
(1) the conduct characterized by the words must be "independently material to
the issue," (2) the conduct must be "equivocal," (3) the utterance must "aid in
giving legal significance to the conduct"; and (4) the utterance must "accom-
pany the conduct." 6 WIGMORE'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1772,
at 268 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976). Sometimes Wigmore uses the phrase "verbal
part of an act," e.g. id-, § 1772 at 267, and sometimes, as in the passage used
above, he uses the more common "verbal act" in describing this type of
evidence.
251. The "simple limitations" quoted in the preceding footnote would seem
to permit a declarant's contemporaneous explanation of his or her own con-
duct to be treated as a nonhearsay verbal act, even if the explanation depends
for value on credibility and is not legally operative. For example, the declar-
ant's statement "I'm going to fire a warning shot" when shooting at an escap-
ing thief apparently would be a "verbal act" when used to show absence of
intent to kill. Although the evidence should be admitted under an exception,
it is wrong to classify it as nonhearsay under either a declarant or an assertion
definition, because it is offered to prove the truth of what it asserts and be-
cause it depends for value on credibility. In discussing "verbal acts," Wigmore
does give some examples similar to the one just stated. Wigmore would admit
as nonhearsay the statements of a defendant found in recent possession of sto-
len goods, i& § 1781, at 307, so evidently the defendant's explanation that he or
she bought a watch in a flea market would be admissible on the issue of good
faith, even though it depends for value on credibility and is offered for its
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in this fashion.252
Another likely survivor of any rule change is the phrase
"circumstantial evidence," which also has been applied to ver-
bal conduct with hearsay dangers in a way connoting nonverbal
conduct. By facile use of the label, a writing identifying the
owner of an object can be treated as if it were some other cir-
cumstance, such as a fingerprint on the object, that allowed the
object to be traced.253 This use of the phrase is likely to survive
any rule change.
Moreover, a rule change might add new terms to dazzle
and confuse. It would be tedious to explore all the interpretive
problems that different variations of a new hearsay definition
might create. I will offer only one example.
Suppose the mysterious concept of "assertion" were aban-
doned, and instead hearsay was defined as any verbal conduct
that depended for value on the declarant's credibility. The con-
cept of reliance on credibility also could be mysterious. Con-
sider Bridges v. State.2 54 In Bridges, a young girl described an
apartment in which she had been sexually abused, and a sus-
pect later was found who inhabited an apartment matching the
description.2 The girl's out-of-court statements were offered
at trial to show that she had been in the apartment.2 6 Morgan
argued that use of these statements involves hearsay dan-
gers.257 Others, including the revisers of McCormick on Evi-
dence,258 have said that it does not. I believe that use of the
evidence does involve some reliance on the declarant's memory,
perception, narration, and sincerity. For example, if the trier
believed the girl was insincere, that belief would diminish to
some extent the probative value of her out-of-court statement.
The girl could have learned the contents of the apartment with-
out having been there,259 or her description could have matched
truth. See id.; see also id § 1777, at 281 (indicating that statements in connec-
tion with taking of property, offered to negate larcenous intent, are nonhear-
say verbal acts); id. § 1778, at 283 n.9 (noting with approval a case in which
subsequent utterance of testator about reason for closing house admissible as
nonhearsay).
252. See Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A
Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REV.
423, 448 & n.80 (1981).
253. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
254. 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945).
255. Id at 355-58, 19 N.W.2d at 531-32.
256. Id at 364, 19 N.W.2d at 535.
257. Morgan, Evidence 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 544 (1948).
258. MCCORmiCK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 742 (E. Cleary 3d. ed. 1984).
259. Of course, if we assume that the girl's description was detailed, the
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the apartment by coincidence.260 Bridges illustrates that the
concept of reliance on credibility will have some gray areas. A
definition treating as hearsay all utterances that to any degree
depend for value on credibility would push many innocuous ut-
terances into the residual exceptions, causing inconvenience or
injustice if the requirements of notice and superior probative
value were enforced. 261 Credibility, therefore, might become a
complex term of art.
One of the perceived advantages of revision is precision in
identifying the reasons courts exclude hearsay. That precision
could be achieved if the definition of hearsay excluded from the
concept of hearsay all statements whose reception into evidence
did not incur any of the risks the hearsay rule prevents. The
hearsay exceptions then could deal with statements that raise
some risks, but that nevertheless ought to be admitted for pru-
dential reasons. A definition of hearsay that makes all state-
ments hearsay whose value depends on credibility holds the
allure of neatness. Such neatness, however, may be unattaina-
ble. First, the assumptions behind the credibility-based defini-
tion would be reductionist. Avoiding the danger of reliance on
an untested declarant is not the only reason for excluding hear-
say. In some contexts, the danger that an in-court witness
fabricated a statement, or that reception of evidence will en-
courage abuse of police power, seems to have played as large a
role as the four traditional "hearsay dangers" in excluding cer-
chances that she was able to describe the apartment without having been pres-
ent are very low, even if we assume that her character for truthfulness was
also poor. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 681-683. That does not mean that
the hearsay dangers are nonexistent, merely that they are very low. Under a
strict interpretation of the declarant definition of hearsay, her statement still
would have to be treated as hearsay, although it might come in as a prior con-
sistent statement or under the residual exception. Of course, one could seek to
modify the declarant definition to accommodate Bridges by saying that it ap-
plies only when there has been substantial reliance on credibility. This course
of action, however, would turn the hearsay definition into another general
residual exception, under which testimony deemed reliable would be admitted
without the requirement that notice be given and that the method of proof be
superior to others.
260. Although the use of the girl's statements in evidence involves some
degree of reliance on her credibility, her statements nevertheless should have
been received in evidence. For a fuller statement of my view of Bridges and of
the grounds on which the girl's statements could have been received, see Park,
supra note 252, at 439-40.
261. The residual exceptions, FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5), set forth
prehearing notice requirements and a requirement that the evidence be "more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts." FED. R. EvID. 803(24),
804(b)(5).
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tain types of hearsay. 26 2
Further, the Federal Rules could not achieve complete ana-
lytic precision without also eliminating the mishmash of other
categories established by Rule 801(d). 26 3 Moreover, a definition
that classified as hearsay all utterances depending to any de-
gree on memory, perception, narration, or sincerity would yield
surprising and unwanted results in the classification of certain
types of utterances that traditionally have been labeled
nonhearsay as verbal acts or legally operative language. Yet,
seeking to modify the declarant definition to classify as
nonhearsay utterances that involve some hearsay dangers sacri-
fices the definition's analytic purity. Finally, some of the confu-
sion in the hearsay definition appears to result from use of
vague terms like "verbal act" and "circumstantial evidence" as
substitutes for the hearsay definition, and no reformulation
likely would stamp out this tendency.
The second main argument against the truth-of-the-matter-
asserted definition is that it could produce anomalous results,
because there is no distinction rooted in policy between implied
assertions and direct assertions. This argument, to the extent it
differs from an argument based on the clarity of the definition,
must derive from a perceived danger of injustice.
A review of the published caselaw does not reveal any obvi-
ous signs of injustice. There are no anguished judicial cries for
change, or complaints about being bound by an inflexible code
that only Congress can change. Nor are there glaring examples
of obviously unreliable hearsay that has been admitted because
of lacunae in the assertion definition. Courts applying the defi-
nition seem to have accomplished good results in almost every
published case. Alhough one can hypothesize utterances in-
volving implied assertions that raise great hearsay dangers,
these utterances are not the ones courts have admitted as im-
plied assertions under the modern caselaw.
Indeed, courts seem to have used the concepts of nonasser-
tive conduct, and of assertive conduct offered to prove some-
thing other than the matter asserted, in a manner consistent
with the Advisory Committee's theory that sincerity dangers
are lessened.264 The cases generally involve utterances classed
as nonhearsay that raise no real insincerity dangers affecting
262. See Park, supra note 13, at 62-65, 79-80, 83-84, 102-04.
263. FED. R. EviD. 801(d) (classifying certain prior statements by witness
and admissions of party-opponent as nonhearsay).
264. See sup-ra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74:783
IMPLIED ASSERTIONS AS HEARSAY
the purpose for which they are being used. The persons who
made the intercepted calls to bookmakers are very unlikely to
have been consciously plotting to incriminate the bookmakers.
It is unlikely that codefendants who made false statements ex-
culpating their accomplices were hoping to incriminate their ac-
complices. The makers of secret records of drug dealing and
gambling are unlikely to have manufactured them and left
them on the premises so they later would be used to incrimi-
nate those on the premises. This sort of frame-up possibly
could occur, just as someone might frame a defendant by plant-
ing drug paraphernalia on the premises. The need for cross-ex-
amination, however, is no greater in the case of drug books
than in the case of drug paraphernalia, when the only purpose
of the evidence is to show the use of the premises. Nor, finally,
are declarants who create documents that later are used as in-
direct evidence to show association or linkage likely to have
done so for purposes of falsely showing association.2 65 The per-
son carrying another's name and phone number on a slip of pa-
per in his or her pocket possibly might foresee that someone
later could find the paper and infer that the person in posses-
sion knew the person named on the paper. The chance of this
being done deliberately to create that false impression is
trifling.266
Revising the hearsay definition would have some inconve-
nient consequences. First, the reviser must decide what to do
with utterances that now slip past the hearsay rule as nonasser-
tive verbal conduct or as assertions offered inferentially. One
option would be to codify, along with a change in the hearsay
definition, a set of exceptions to cover these utterances. Then,
even if changing the definition of hearsay simplified it, the
larger code would be complicated by the added set of excep-
tions for utterances offered as falsehoods, utterances that indi-
rectly characterize an establishment, and utterances used to
show association. I do not think the additional exceptions
would be worth the candle.
It is tempting to say that these classes of utterances should
be handled under the residual exceptions. That approach, how-
ever, also has its costs. The residual exceptions are hedged
about with restrictions that courts either must follow or ignore.
Consider, for example, evidence that one person mentioned an-
other's name, offered solely to show association. This sort of
265. See supra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
266. See id.
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evidence is not the type that invariably should be subject to the
requirements of the residual exceptions - that pretrial notice
be given, and that the evidence be "more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the pro-
ponent can procure through reasonable efforts."26 7 The fact
that the mention of the name, or the entry in the address book,
is not more probative in showing association than other evi-
dence that reasonably could be offered does not mean it should
be excluded. To push relatively innocuous evidence of this na-
ture into the residual exceptions is to invite courts to ignore the
requirements of the residual exceptions. This process already is
partly underway,268 and threatens to weaken the limits of the
residual exceptions in cases involving dangerous evidence. Per-
haps we need not fear so much the distortion of the hearsay
definition as we should fear the distortion of the residual
exceptions.
Adopting a declarant definition would not eliminate ambi-
guities from the classification of hearsay. Although no policy
behind the assertion definition distinguishes implied assertions
from direct assertions, courts applying the definition have
reached fair results.
CONCLUSION
The declarant and assertion definitions of hearsay often
yield the same results, but they can differ in classifying implied
assertions. This review of modern caselaw suggests that federal
courts are reaching fair results in resolving implied assertion
problems under the existing assertion definition. To change to
a declarant definition would eliminate a familiar rule that
works well in most situations. Change also would cause new
interpretive problems and probably would entail creation of
new hearsay exceptions. The existing definition of hearsay has
worked tolerably well and should be retained.
267. FED. R. Evin. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
268. See generally Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The
Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness,
and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 458-67 (1986);
Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Excep-
tions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867, 877-905 (1982).
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